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Most recent research on monetary-policy rules is restricted to considering a commitment to simple 
instrument rules, where the central-bank instrument is a simple function of available information 
about the economy, like the Taylor rule. However, a commitment to a simple instrument rule 
appears inadequate as a description of current goal-directed and forward-looking monetary policy, 
especially inflation targeting. The latter can to a large extent instead be seen as inflation-forecast 
targeting, setting the instrument so that the corresponding conditional inflation forecast is 
consistent with the inflation target. It is argued, both from a descriptive and a prescriptive 
perspective, that inflation targeting is better understood as a commitment to a targeting rule, either 
a general targeting rule in the form of clear objectives for monetary policy or a specific targeting 
rule in the form of a condition for (the forecasts of) the target variables, essentially the equality of 
the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution between the target 
variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra-model information, are more robust 
and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy 
close to the socially optimal equilibrium. These ideas are illustrated with the help of simple 
examples. Some recent defense of commitment to simple instrument rules and criticism of forward-
looking monetary policy and targeting rules by McCallum, Nelson and Woodford are also 
addressed. In the concluding section, robust and optimal rules for monetary policy are suggested. 
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
What are the rules for good monetary policy? Here, “good monetary policy” is used in the
conventional meaning of successfully stabilizing inﬂation around a low average level, with some
concern for stabilizing output around potential output, what has been called “ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting” in the literature (see, for instance, the contributions to the inﬂuential Jackson-Hole
symposium organized by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City [31]).1 What answer does the
large literature on monetary-policy rules supply? Most of that literature uses a very narrow
interpretation of “policy rule.” According to this interpretation, a policy rule expresses the
central bank’s instrument (usually a short interest rate, the instrument rate; the federal funds
rate in the U.S., for instance) as an explicit function of information available to the central
bank. Such a policy rule can be called an instrument rule. In particular, most of the literature
focuses on simple instrument rules, where the instrument is a function of a small subset of the
information available to the central bank. The best-known simple instrument rule is the Taylor
rule [100], where the instrument rate responds only to the inﬂation and output gaps according
to
it = ¯ f + fπ(πt − π∗)+fxxt, (1.1)
where it is the instrument rate in period t, ¯ f is a constant, πt −π∗ is the “inﬂation gap,” where
πt is (the rate of) inﬂation and π∗ ≥ 0i sag i v e ni n ﬂation target, xt ≡ yt − y∗
t is the output
gap, where yt is (log) output and y∗
t is (log) potential output, and the coeﬃcients fπ and fx
are positive. The constant ¯ f equals the sum of the average short real interest rate and the
inﬂation target. In the original Taylor [100] formulation, the coeﬃcients fπ and fx are 1.5 and
.5, respectively; the inﬂation target π∗ is 2% (per year), the average short real interest rate is
2%, and the coeﬃcient ¯ f is hence 4%.2
Much research during the last two decades has examined simple instrument rules (mostly
variants of the Taylor rule), both from a descriptive and a prescriptive perspective (see, for
instance, McCallum [65] and the contributions in Bryant, Hooper and Mann [15] and Taylor
1 A noncontroversial objective of monetary policy would be to contribute to the welfare of the representative
citizen. This is not an operational objective, though. An increasing number of countries have instead announced
“price stability” (meaning low and stable inﬂation) as the primary objective for monetary policy, with some
implicit or explicit concern also for the stability of the real economy, with the view that this is the best contribution
monetary policy can make to citizens’ welfare.
2 Wicksell [112] and Henderson and McKibbin [43] have suggested other simple instrument rules with the
interest rate as the instrument. Meltzer [68] and McCallum [63] have suggested simple instrument rules with the
monetary base as the instrument. The ﬁrst empirical estimates of interest-rate reaction functions may have been
in the 1960s by Dewald and Johnson [28] and Christian [22]. Recent general discussions of Taylor rules include
Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [25], Hetzel [46], Kozicki [53] and Woodford [118].
1[103]). The introduction by Taylor [101] gives a summary of the standard approach of specifying
a model, a class of simple instrument rules and a loss function for evaluating alternative simple
instrument rules in the class. From a descriptive perspective, it has been examined to what
extent simple instrument rules are good empirical descriptions of central-bank behavior (see,
for instance, Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [24] and Judd and Rudebusch [48]). From a prescriptive
perspective, it has been examined how simple instrument rules perform (in the sense of stabiliz-
ing inﬂation around an inﬂation target without causing unnecessary output-gap variability) in
diﬀerent macro models.
The research on instrument rules has contributed many important insights. These insights
include that stability of inﬂation and determinacy of equilibria in sticky-price models require the
long-run response of the short interest rate to inﬂation to be larger than one-to-one, the so-called
“Taylor principle” (see Taylor [102] and Woodford [118]),3 and that interest-rate smoothing, in
the sense of responding to the lagged instrument rate, may improve performance by introducing
desirable “history-dependence” that beneﬁcially inﬂuences private-sector inﬂation expectations
(see Rotemberg and Woodford [75] and Woodford [115]). Other insights are that it is better that
the instrument responds to the determinants of the target variables than to the target variables
themselves (for instance, even if inﬂation is the only target variable (the only variable in the loss
function), it is generally better to respond to both current inﬂation and the output gap, since
both of these are determinants of future inﬂation; see for instance, Svensson [85] and Rudebusch
and Svensson [78]), and that the response coeﬃcients in the optimal reaction function depend
on the weights in the loss function on diﬀerent target variables in sometimes nonintuitive and
complex ways (see, for instance, Svensson [85]). One line of research has examined to what
extent a given simple instrument rule is “robust,” in the sense of performing reasonably well in
diﬀerent macro models. Given the uncertainty about which model is the best representation of
reality, little would then be lost if central banks would apply a robust simple instrument rule.
Results to date, although arguably from not too diﬀerent models of closed economies, indicate
that variants of the Taylor rule can be quite robust in this sense.4
Thus, the answer from most of the literature on monetary-policy rules to the question posed
above seems to be that central banks should commit to following a speciﬁc simple instrument
3 Several recent papers, for instance, Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe [5], Carlstrom and Fuerst [18] and
Christiano and Gust [23], examine determinacy and multiplicity of equilibria under the assumption that the
central bank follows Taylor-type instrument rules.
4 McCallum has in several papers, for instance, [63], examined robustness properties of a simple instrument rule
for the monetary base. Levin, Wieland and Williams [57] and Rudebusch [77] examine the robustness properties
of Taylor-type rules.
2rule. Indeed, Federal Reserve Board Governor Yellen, in a discussion of inﬂation targeting at
the FOMC meeting in January, 1995, [33, p. 43—44], seems to prefer a Taylor-type rule as a
suitable policy rule for the Federal Reserve System:
[I]t seems to me that a reaction function in which the real funds rate changes by
roughly equal amounts in response to deviations of inﬂation from a target of 2 percent
and to deviations of actual from potential output describes tolerably well what this
Committee has done since 1986. This policy... is an example of the type of hybrid
rule that would be preferable [to inﬂation targeting] in my view, if we wanted a rule.
I think the Greenspan Fed has done very well following such a rule, and I think that
is what sensible central banks do.”
Thus, if a central bank wants to commit itself to a simple instrument rule, it should announce
the simple instrument rule and then mechanically follow it. This has the further implication
that once the decision about the instrument rule is made, the decision process of the bank is ex-
ceedingly simple and mechanical. For the Taylor rule, it just consists of regularly collecting data
on inﬂation and output, collecting either external estimates of potential output or constructing
internal estimates, and then calculating the output gap. (Estimating potential output is a non-
trivial matter, though, and a major challenge in practical monetary policy.) Once these inputs
in the Taylor rule are available, calculating the instrument-setting is completely mechanical. In
particular, there is no room for judgment (except that judgment may enter in the estimation of
potential output). As McCallum [66] has expressed it, policy decisions could be turned over to
“a clerk armed with a simple formula and a hand calculator.”
However, another possible answer from the literature on policy rules is that the instrument
rules proposed should not be followed mechanically. Thus, a ﬁrm commitment to the instrument
rules is not desirable. Instead, the instrument rules should be seen as mere “guidelines” for
monetary policy. This is the view expressed by Taylor, for instance in [100] and, in more detail,
in [105]. A problem with this answer and use of simple instrument rules is that the rule is then
incomplete: some deviations are allowed, but there are no rules for when deviations from the
instrument rulse are appropriate. As discussed further below, this arguably makes the idea of
simple instrument rules as mere guidlines for monetary policy too vague to be operational.
The contrast between these two alternative answers from most of the literature on monetary-
policy rules and actual monetary-policy practice is striking. First, monetary-policy reform in a
number of countries during the 1990s has to a large extent focused on (1) formulating explicit and
increasingly precise objectives for monetary policy and (2) creating an institutional setting where
the central bank is strongly committed to achieving those objectives (see, for instance, Bernanke,
3Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [7]). Thus, there has been commitment to objectives rather than
to simple instrument rules. Second, central banks have developed very elaborate and complex
decision-making processes, where large amounts of information are collected, processed and
analyzed, and where considerable judgment is exercised (see, for instance, Brash [13]). Third,
any simple rules of thumb actually used are conditions for target variables or forecasts of target
variables, rather than explicit formulas for the instrument rate. This is the case, for instance, for
the rule of thumb expressed by the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank (the central bank
of Sweden), that normally, the interest rate should be adjusted such that the resulting inﬂation
forecast at an appropriate horizon (usually about two-years ahead) is on target.5 No central
bank has so far made a commitment to a simple instrument rule like the Taylor rule or variants
thereof. Neither has any central bank announced a particular instrument rule as a “guideline.”
Thus, there appears to be a substantial gap between the research on instrument rules and the
practice of monetary policy. This paper discusses and proposes a way to bridge that gap. From
a descriptive perspective, it argues that, in order to be useful for discussing real-world monetary
policy, the concept of monetary-policy rules has to be broadened and deﬁned as “a prescribed
guide for monetary-policy conduct,” including “targeting rules” as well as “instrument rules.”6
Furthermore, it argues that the monetary-policy practice is better discussed in terms of targeting
rules than instrument rules. A general targeting rule speciﬁes the objectives to be achieved, for
instance, by listing the target variables, the targets (target levels) for those variables, and the
(explicit or implicit) loss function to be minimized. A speciﬁc targeting rule speciﬁes conditions
for the target variables (or forecasts of the target variables), for instance, like the above rule
of thumb of the Bank of England and the Riksbank. From a prescriptive perspective, this
paper argues that a commitment to targeting rules has a number of advantages, for instance, in
5 This rule furthermore refers to constant-interest-rate forecasts, since both the Bank of England and the
Riksbank mainly rely on such forecasts.
The rule has been stated by Charles Goodhart [39], former member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy
Committee, as: “When I was a member of the MPC I thought that I was trying, at each forecast round, to set the
level of interest rates, on each occasion, so that without the need for future rate changes prospective (forecast)
inﬂation would on average equal the target at the policy horizon. This was, I thought, what the exercise was
supposed to be.”
The rule has been stated by Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Riksbank, as: “Monetary policy is
normally conducted so as to be on target, deﬁned in terms of the CPI, one to two years ahead.” Furthermore, any
departures from this general rule, due to transitory disturbances to inﬂation or real costs from a quick return of
inﬂation to target, will be announced by the Riksbank in advance (Heikensten [44, p. 16]). Heikensten and Vredin
[45] provide more discussion of the application of the rule. Berg [6] gives an extensive account and discussion of
the Riksbank’s implementation of inﬂation targeting.
6 Target(ing) rules have previously been discussed by Sims [80] (see footnote 37 below), Rogoﬀ [74], Walsh
[111], Svensson [85] and [88], Rudebusch and Svensson [78], Cecchetti [19] and [20], Clarida, Gali and Gertler [25]
and Svensson and Woodford [96]. After the ﬁrst versions of this paper were written, Giannoni and Woodford
have provided a derivation of an optimal targeting rule in a general linear-quadratic model in [37] and a detailed
discussion of optimal targeting rules in the basic New-Keynsian model in [38].
4allowing the use of all relevant information, in particular, allowing the use of judgment, being
more robust to both disturbances and model variation than instrument rules, and likely leading
to better monetary-policy outcomes than instrument rules. Presumably, this is why real-world
monetary policy and monetary-policy reform have shunned commitment to instrument rules.
Before the rational-expectations revolution in macroeconomics, the behavior of ﬁrms and
households was frequently represented by simple ad hoc reaction functions, for instance, con-
sumption and investment functions. The rational-expectations revolution led to an emphasis on
optimizing and forward-looking behavior by private agents, and their behavior being represented
by ﬁrst-order conditions, Euler conditions, derived from their objectives and constraints. Still,
the pioneers of the rational-expectations revolution continued to represent economic policy by
mechanical reaction functions, which ignores that under optimizing policy those reaction func-
tions would be as much subject to the essence of the Lucas critique (that reaction functions are
endogenous) as mechanical reaction functions for private agents.
Monetary policy by the world’s more advanced central banks these days is at least as optimiz-
ing and forward-looking as the behavior of the most rational private agents. I ﬁnd it strange that
a large part of the literature on monetary policy still prefers to represent central bank behavior
with the help of mechanical instrument rules. The concept of general and speciﬁc targeting
rules is designed to provide a discussion of monetary policy rules that is fully consistent with
the optimizing and forward-looking nature of modern monetary policy. From this point of view,
general targeting rules essentially specify operational objectives for monetary policy and speciﬁc
targeting rules essentially specify operational Euler conditions for monetary policy. In particu-
lar, an optimal targeting rule expresses the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and
the marginal rates of substitution between the target variables in an operational way.7
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary-policy prob-
lem facing an inﬂation-targeting central bank, namely, to stabilize inﬂation around an inﬂation
target with (under realistic “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting) some weight also on stabilizing the
output gap. The central-bank objective is expressed as a conventional intertemporal loss func-
7 Much monetary-policy reform during the last decade can be interpreted in terms of achieving a trinity of
(1) a mandate in the form of clear objectives for monetary policy, (2) operational independence for the central
bank, and (3) accountability of the central bank for fulﬁlling the mandate. Operational independence (also called
instrument-independence) protects the central bank from short-term political pressure to stray from its objectives
and accountability structures strengthens the bank’s commitment to fulﬁlling the mandate. This trinity can be
seen as directed towards making monetary policy goal-directed and therefore optimizing, systematic and rule-like.
New Zealand since the passing of the R e s e r v eB a n kA c tin 1989, provides a good example and has been a source
of inspiration for reform in many other countries. In May 2000, I was asked by the Minister of Finance of the New
Zealand Government to conduct a review of monetary policy in New Zealand. The evaluation of the goal-directed
and forward-looking monetary policy in New Zealand raised many interesting issues and is discussed in Svensson
[91].
5tion to be minimized, subject to the central bank’s information about the state of the economy
and its view of the transmission mechanism. For concreteness, two simple examples of models
of the transmission mechanism are presented, one backward-looking and one forward-looking.
Section 3 discusses a direct optimal-control approach: to solve the optimization problem for the
optimal reaction function once and for all and then make a commitment to follow that reaction
function. It is shown that even in the simple examples of the transmission mechanism used
here, the optimal reaction functions are too complex to be practicable, not to mention veriﬁable
(further speciﬁed in section 3). For this and a number of other reasons discussed, the direct
optimal-control approach must be judged infeasible. Section 4 discusses a commitment to a
simple instrument rule, which, although in principle veriﬁable, is found to be inadequate as a
positive description of real-world inﬂation targeting and likely to be unsuitable as a normative
recommendation for monetary policy. This section also discusses the alternative weaker proposal
that simple instrument rules should be used as mere “guidelines,” from which deviations some-
times are called for; this proposal is however found incomplete, since it doesn’t specify when
deviations are appropriate. Section 5 deﬁnes targeting rules and argues that a commitment to a
targeting rule is both an appropriate description of real-world inﬂation targeting and a suitable
normative recommendation for future monetary-policy developments. This section, as well as
the previous two sections to some extent, also responds to recent discussion by McCallum [66],
McCallum and Nelson [67] and Woodford [113] regarding the positive and normative role of
commitment to instrument rules and targeting rules. Section 6 summarizes and presents some
conclusions. Appendices A-C contain technical and other details.
2 The monetary-policy problem
In order to induce suﬃcient precision and clarity in the discussion, and to avoid the confusion and
misunderstanding in some of the literature on monetary-policy rules, it is necessary to provide
a bit of formal notation. Inﬂation targeting involves stabilizing inﬂation around an inﬂation
target. In practice, as discussed in a number of recent contributions (see, for instance, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City [30] and [31]), inﬂation targeting is “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting,
in the sense that it also involves some concern about the stability of the real economy.8 These
objectives are conventionally and conveniently expressed as an intertemporal loss function to
8 I thus here abstract from any separate objective to stabilize or smooth interest rates, an objective which is
diﬃcult to rationalize. Such objectives and their consequences are discussed separately in section 5.6.
6be minimized in each period t, t = ...,−1,0,1,...,consisting of the expected sum of discounted









Here E[·|It,zt] denotes rational expectations conditional on the central bank’s information, It,
in period t about the state of the economy and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
and the bank’s “judgment,” zt,t ob ef u r t h e rs p e c i ﬁed below. Furthermore, δ (0 <δ<1) is a
discount factor and Lt denotes the period loss in period t.T h es c a l i n gb y1 −δ is practical, since
then the scaled discount factors sum to unity, so the intertemporal loss is a weighted average
of the expected period loss and hence of the same order of magnitude. The period loss is a









where λ>0 is a given weight on output-gap stabilization relative to inﬂation stabilization.
Since the implicit output target in (2.2) is not subject to choice but given by potential output,
the output target is not “overambitious”, so there is no conspicuous reason for an inﬂation bias
(average inﬂation above the inﬂation target) as in the literature on the time-consistency problem
following Kydland and Prescott [54] and Barro and Gordon [3]. “Strict” inﬂation targeting would
be the (unrealistic) special case of λ =0 .T h u s ,f o rλ>0, we have ﬂexible inﬂation targeting and
both inﬂation and the output gap are target variables (target variables in the sense of entering
the loss function). (The above-mentioned FOMC discussion of inﬂation targeting in January
1995, [33, p. 38—59], is very interesting but somewhat surprising, since all FOMC members seem
to interpret inﬂation targeting as strict inﬂation targeting, and no member seems aware of the
fact that real-world inﬂation targeting is ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.)9




the weighted unconditional variances of inﬂation and the output gap. This loss function can be










9 Note that, since the intertemporal loss function is the expected discounted future losses, this formulation
includes the realistic case when potential output, y
∗
t, is unobservable and has to be estimated.
10 The scaling by 1 − δ in (2.1) keeps the limit ﬁnite.
7Thus, if the unconditional means fulﬁll E[πt]=π∗ and E[xt] = 0, the limit of the intertemporal
loss function is (2.3).
The monetary-policy problem for the central bank is then to set its monetary-policy instru-
ment each period t, it (usually a short interest rate, the “instrument rate”), so as to minimize
the intertemporal loss function (2.1), subject to the central bank’s information, It,a b o u tt h e
state of the economy (including its view of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy,
that is, how the instrument aﬀects the target variables) and the central bank’s judgment, zt (see
below).
For concreteness, I will use two simple examples of standard models of the transmission
mechanism, one “backward-looking” and one “forward-looking”.
2.1 Example 1: A simple backward-looking model of the transmission mechanism
This example of a simple backward-looking model of a closed economy is a variant of that in
Svensson [85] and Rudebusch and Svensson [78].11 The model has a one-period control lag for
the output gap, and a two-period control lag for inﬂation. For reasons explained below in section
5.4.1, it is practical (and not unrealistic) to let the period be some 3 quarters (the period in
Svensson [85] is taken to be about a year). The main simpliﬁcation of the backward-looking
model is that private-sector expectations are implicitly treated as adaptive expectations, which
simpliﬁes the discussion considerably.
Suppose aggregate supply (the Phillips curve) is given by
πt+1 = πt + αxxt + αzzt+1 + εt+1, (2.4)
where the coeﬃcient αx is positive, zt+1 is a column vector exogenous variables discussed below,
αz is a corresponding row vector of coeﬃcients multiplying the elements of zt+1,s oαzzt+1 is
the scalar product of the two vectors, and εt is an iid “cost-push” shock with zero mean and
variance σ2
ε. Let aggregate demand (in terms of the output gap) be given by
xt+1 = βxxt + βzzt+1 − βr(rt − ¯ r)+ηt+1, (2.5)
where the coeﬃcients βx and βr are positive, βz is a row vector of coeﬃcients multiplying the
elements of zt+1, rt is a short real interest rate given by
rt ≡ it − πt+1|t, (2.6)
11 Ball [2] has later used the same model as Svensson [85].
8where it is a short nominal interest rate and the central bank’s instrument, ¯ r is the average
real interest rate, and ηt is an iid “excess demand” shock with zero mean and variance σ2
η.12
Furthermore, qt+τ|t for any variable q denotes Etqt+τ|t ≡ E[qt+τ|It], the rational expectation of
qt+τ conditional on the information available in period t, It. Under the assumption of symmetric
information, the private sector has the same information as the central bank, so πt+1|t is one-
period-ahead private-sector inﬂation expectations, and hence it−πt+1|t is the short real interest
rate. Potential output, y∗
t, is assumed to be an exogenous stochastic process.
Let zt+1 be a vector of unobservable exogenous variable called the deviation. The idea is that
it represents additional determinants of future inﬂation (when the corresponding elements of the
vector αz are nonzero) and the output gap (when the corresponding elements of βz are nonzero)
than current inﬂation and the output gap, or the deviation of the true model of inﬂation and
output-gap determination from the simple model with the deviation equal to zero. Thus, the
sequence of deviations, {zt+τ}∞
τ=−∞ can be interpreted as unobservable model perturbations, as
in the literature on robust control.13 The central bank’s estimate of zt+τ in period t is denoted
by zt+τ,t. The sequence zt ≡ {zt+τ,t}∞
τ=−∞ of the bank’s estimate in period t of past and future
deviations is identiﬁed with the bank’s judgment in period t. It represents the unavoidable
judgment (almost) always applied in monetary policy. Any explicit model is always taken as, at
best, an approximation of the true model of the economy, and monetary-policy makers always
ﬁnd it necessary to make some judgmental adjustments to the results of any given model. The
so-called “add factors” applied to model equations in central-bank projections are one aspect
of central-bank judgment, see Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox [73]. The general notation
obviously allows for judgement aﬀecting both future inﬂation and output as well as estimates of
potential output.
One simple information structure, consistent with the deviation zt being unobservable, is
when inﬂation πt, output yt, potential output y∗
t, and the short real rate rt are all observable
in period t, but the shocks εt and ηt are unobservable. A somewhat more complex (but very
realistic) information structure would make a time-variable component of potential output un-
observable and aﬀected by the deviation. Since what enters in the intertemporal loss function
is expected current and future period losses, the intertemporal loss function is consistent with
12 A slightly more complex variant of the backward-looking model would replace the constant average real
interest rate, ¯ r, with an exogenous stochastic time-varying Wicksellian real natural interest rate, r
∗
t,a si nt h e
forward-looking model below.
13 See, for instance, Hansen and Sargent [41] and Onatski and Stock [70]. However, that literature deals with
the more complex case when the model perturbations are endogenous and chosen by nature to correspond to a
worst-case scenario.
9potential output and the output gap being unobservable. In the aggregate demand equation,
the deviation could be interpreted as an unobservable time-variable component of a Wicksellian
natural real interest rate.
Given this interpretation of the deviation zt+1, it would be completely misleading to make a
simplifying assumption like it being an exogenous autoregressive process.14 Thus, I will refrain
from such an assumption and instead leave the dynamic properties of zt+1 unspeciﬁed (except
assuming that the unconditional mean of the deviation is zero, E[zt+1] = 0). Instead, the focus
will be on the central bank’s judgment zt in period t of the whole sequence of future (and past)
deviations. For simplicity, I assume that the central bank’s judgment is exogenous in any period
t. For simplicity, I also assume that there is symmetric information in that the private sector has
the same information about the economy and the transmission mechanism, and that the private
sector’s rational expectation in period t of the sequence {zt+τ}∞
τ=−∞, denoted z|t ≡ {zt+τ|t}∞
τ=−∞
(the private-sector judgment), coincides with the central-bank judgment, zt.15
Thus, I assume that πt and xt are observable and known in the beginning of period t.
Furthermore, I assume that the central bank’s instrument it is then set for the duration of
period t. Note that one-period-ahead inﬂation expectations, πt+1|t, are predetermined,
πt+1|t = πt + αxxt + αzzt+1|t, (2.7)
in the sense that they do not depend on the instrument setting in period t, it, and only depend
on πt, xt and zt+1|t, which in turn are predetermined because of (2.4), (2.5) and the assumption
that zt is exogenous.16
Thus, the setup implies that inﬂation and the output gap in the current period t are prede-
termined by previous decisions and current exogenous shocks (the shocks include the diﬀerence
between the deviation and the previous private-sector judgment, zt+1−zt+1|t). Current inﬂation
expectations for the next period, πt+1|t, are also predetermined by current inﬂation, the output
gap and the deviation according to (2.7). Actual inﬂation in the next period, πt+1,w i l lt h e n
equal these inﬂation expectations plus next period’s unobservable cost-push shock, εt+1,a n dt h e
14 For instance, assuming that the deviation follows zt+1 = Γzt + θt+1,w h e r eΓ is a matrix with eigenvalues
inside the unit circle and θt+1 is a vector of zero-mean iid shocks with constant covariance matrix.
15 Thus, under the assumption of observable inﬂation and output gaps, the central bank’s and the private
sector’s estimates in period t + 1 of the unobservable cost-push and excess-demand shocks are by (2.4) and (2.5)
trivially given by




ηt+1,t+1 = ηt+1|t+1 = yt+1 − y
∗
t+1 − βy(yt − y
∗
t) − βzzt+1,t+1 + βr(rt − ¯ r),
16 Intuitively, a variable is predetermined if it only depends on lagged variables and current exogenous shocks.
Formally, a variable is predetermined if it has exogenous one-period-ahead forecast errors.
10eﬀect of any unanticipated shock to the deviation, zt+1−zt+1|t. Next period’s output gap, xt+1,
will be determined by the current variables, current inﬂation expectations, the current instru-
ment setting, it, next period’s deviation, zt+1, and next period’s output-gap shock, ηt+1.T h u s ,
the central bank can aﬀect the output gap in the next period, but it cannot aﬀect inﬂation until
two periods ahead. That is, the control lags for the output gap and inﬂation are one and two
periods (3 and 6 quarters), respectively. As shown in Rudebusch and Svensson [78], a variant of
this simple backward-looking model ﬁts U.S. data quite well.
2.2 Example 2: A simple forward-looking model of the transmission mechanism
As another example of a standard model of the transmission mechanism, consider the so-called
New-Keynesian model with forward-looking aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand relations,
similar to the one used in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [25]. I use the variant in Svensson and
Woodford [96], where current inﬂation and output gap is not forward-looking but predetermined
one period (which is easily motivated as a minimum move towards realism). Instead, the one-
period-ahead inﬂation and output-gap expectations (or “plans”, see below), πt+1|t and xt+1|t,
are forward-looking.17 Furthermore, I use a variant, as in Yun [119], which allows ﬁrms to index
prices to the average inﬂation rate rather than, somewhat arbitrary, only allowing constant
prices between opportunities for price adjustment, as in Calvo [17].18 The aggregate-supply and
aggregate-demand equations are
πt+1 − π = δ(πt+2|t − π)+αxxt+1|t + αzzt+1 + εt+1, (2.8)
xt+1 = xt+2|t − βr(it+1|t − πt+2|t − r∗
t+1)+βzzt+1 + ηt+1, (2.9)
where π ≡ E[πt] is the average inﬂation rate, εt+1 and ηt+1 are iid “cost-push” and “excess-
demand” shocks, and r∗
t is an exogenous Wicksellian natural interest rate corresponding to a
“neutral” real interest rate consistent with a zero output gap in the absence of deviations (see
Woodford [117] for further discussion of the Wicksellian natural interest rate). (For simplicity,
the private-sector discount factor δ in (2.8) is taken to be the same as in the monetary-policy
17 Intuitively, a variable is forward-looking (non-predetermined, or a jump variable) if it depends on expectations
of future variables. Formally, a variable is forward-looking if it has endogenous one-period-ahead forecast errors.
18 The assumption that ﬁrms can index prices to average inﬂation between price adjustment opportunities
has the advantage that the long-run Phillips curve becomes vertical rather than positively sloped (see also the
appendix of the working-paper version of Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe [5]). In the common formulation,
used for instance in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [25], the Phillips curve is instead (without the assumption of prices
predetermined one period)
πt = δπt+1|t + αxxt,
which implies that the long-run Phillips curve (when δ<1) fulﬁlls π = αxx/(1−δ), where π and x is the average
inﬂation and output gap, respectively.
11loss function (2.1).) Again, the exogenous deviation zt+1 enters both equations, to emphasize
the approximative nature of the simple model and the unavoidability of central-bank judgment.
In this model, private-sector one-period-ahead “plans” for inﬂation and the output gap,
πt+1|t and xt+1|t, are determined in period t by
πt+1|t − π = δ(πt+2|t − π)+αxxt+1|t + αzzt+1|t,
xt+1|t = xt+2|t − βr(it+1|t − πt+2|t − r∗
t+1|t)+βzzt+1|t.
Thus, the one-period-ahead inﬂation plan depends on expected future inﬂation, πt+2|t,t h e
output-gap plan, xt+1|t, and the private-sector judgment, zt+1|t. The one-period-ahead output-
gap plan depends on the expected future output gap, xt+2|t, the expected one-period-ahead
real interest-rate gap, it+1|t − πt+2|t − r∗
t+1|t ≡ rt+1|t − r∗
t+1|t, and the private-sector judgment,
zt+1|t.A c t u a li n ﬂation and output gap in period t will then diﬀer from the plans because of the
unanticipated shocks,
πt+1 = πt+1|t + αz(zt+1 − zt+1|t)+εt+1,
xt+1 = xt+1|t + βr(r∗
t+1 − r∗
t+1|t)+βz(zt+1 − zt+1|t)+ηt+1.
Thus, in this model, the period-t expectation of the instrument in period t +1 ,it+1|t,i s
what aﬀects future inﬂation and the output gap. I will assume that the central bank in period
t announces what interest rate it will set in period t +1 ,it+1,t. Since the central bank has no
incentive to stray ex post from any such announcement (since the interest rate does not enter
the period loss function (2.2)), I assume that it will set the actual interest rate it+1 according
to its previous announcement and that the announcement hence will be credible and equal to
the private-sector expectations,19
it+1 = it+1,t = it+1|t.
3 A direct optimal-control approach: Commitment to an optimal instrument
rule
A direct optimal-control approach to the monetary-policy problem would be to solve the monetary-
policy problem once-and-for-all for the optimal reaction function (for a given model, or, more
19 Formally, we could say that the central bank instrument in period t is really the announcement, it+1,t,o f
the future interest rate, rather than the current interest rate, it.
12generally, for a given probability distribution of models). This would result in an optimal reac-
tion function, where the instrument in period t would be a function of the information available
in period t, It, and the central bank’s judgment, zt,
it = F(It,zt).
The optimal reaction function referred to here is the “explicit” reaction function, in the
sense that the instrument is written as a function of current and lagged predetermined variables
and judgment only. In a linear model with predetermined and forward-looking variables and
a quadratic loss function, there is a unique form of the explicit reaction function (see Currie
and Levine [27], S¨ oderlind [83] and Svensson [88]). (This is for a given minimum set of linearly
independent predetermined variables; a model can of course trivially be expressed in terms of
alternative sets of linearly independent predetermined variables). Since, in equilibrium, the
forward-looking variables will be linear functions of the predetermined variables, the instrument
can of course be written as a continuum of linear functions of both the forward-looking and
the predetermined variables.20 In the literature, it is quite common to discuss such reaction
functions where the instrument responds not to predetermined variables but to forward-looking
variables. These can be called “implicit” reaction functions, since they express a functional
relation between the instrument and another endogenous non-predetermined variable. They are
indeed equilibrium conditions, which need to be solved together with the rest of the model in
order to determine the instrument setting. Thus, explicit and implicit reaction functions, and
corresponding explicit and implicit instrument rules, are conceptually distinct. In particular,
implicit instrument rules are not directly operational, since they involve an endogenous variable
that depends on the instrument setting. In any realistic model, current inﬂation and the out-
put gap are predetermined, also in the intuitive sense that they cannot be aﬀected by current
monetary-policy decisions. Then a Taylor rule (with the current instrument rate responding to
current inﬂation and the current output gap) is an explicit reaction function. In many (unreal-
istic) models, current inﬂation and the output gap are forward-looking variables. Then a Taylor
rule is an implicit reaction function, an equilibrium condition. McCallum, in [65], for instance,
has emphasized a related point; that a Taylor rule in a quarterly setting is not operational, since
20 Let Xt and Zt denote the column vectors of predetermined and forward-looking variables, respectively.
Disregard judgment, for simplicity. Let it = FX t be the unique explicit reaction function (for simplicity, under
optimization under discretion; under commitment the optimal reaction function also involves Lagrange multipliers
of the forward-looking equations and thereby lags of the predetermined variables, see below) where F is a unique
row vector or a matrix, depending on whether there are one or several instruments. In equilibrium (under
discretion), the forward-looking variables will be given by Zt = GXt,w h e r eG is a unique matrix. For any matrix
K of appropriate dimension, the instrument fulﬁlls the implicit reaction function it = KZt +( F − KG)Xt.
13output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h ec u r r e n tq u a r t e ri sr e p o r t e dw i t hal a ga n dt h e r e f o r en o tk n o w ni n
the current quarter. However, in such a setting, as discussed in Rudebusch and Svensson [78], a
Taylor rule can be reformulated in terms of responding to the current estimates of current, yet
unreported, output and inﬂation. As long as these estimates rely on predetermined informa-
tion, such a Taylor rule would still be an explicit instrument rule.21 Since, in practice, data on
economic variables are revised several times, all published data, also of past economic variables,
are imperfect estimates of underlying variables. However, veriﬁcation of a particular instrument
rule is of course easier if it relies on published data.
Once the above optimization problem is solved and the optimal (explicit) reaction function
is determined, the central bank would then make a commitment to follow the optimal reaction
function, and follow it mechanically ever after. Thus, once the commitment is made, there is no
more optimizing. This can be called a commitment to the optimal instrument rule.
There are many problems with this approach. For a model with forward-looking variables,
the optimal reaction function is generally not time-consistent, in the sense that the central bank
has an incentive to depart from it in the future. This is the case even if the output target is
equal to potential output and not overambitious, as is the case in the period loss function (2.2).
This is because, even if there is no problem with an average inﬂation bias, there is a problem
with “stabilization bias” and a lack of “history-dependence,” to be further discussed below.
Therefore the commitment to the optimal instrument rule in a forward-looking variable requires
a commitment mechanism, a mechanism by which the central bank can be bound to follow the
optimal reaction function in the future. This in turn requires the optimal instrument rule to be
veriﬁable. By this I mean that it can be objectively and unequivocally established whether the
central bank is diverging from the reaction function in question or not.22
In any realistic model, the technical problem of deriving the optimal reaction function is
overwhelmingly diﬃcult, and the resulting optimal reaction function overwhelmingly complex.
Thus, even if the optimal reaction function could be calculated, it would be far too complex to
ever be veriﬁable. In fact, the optimal reaction function is overwhelmingly complex even for the
simple models presented above, once the optimal response to judgment is taken into account.
21 Svensson and Woodford [97] discuss problems when these estimates depend on forward-looking observable
variables.
22 See Hart [42] and Tirole [107] for discussion of the role of veriﬁability for commitment and incomplete
contracts.
143.1 The backward-looking model
For the backward-looking model, (2.4) and (2.5), appendix A, equation (A.11), shows that the
optimal reaction function is given by






















the discounted sum (with the discount factor δc) of judgments of future deviations in period t,
starting τ periods ahead (in this case, τ = 2). Furthermore, the coeﬃcient c, given by equations
(A.10) and (A.7), depends on the parameters of the model,23 is an increasing function c(λ)o fλ,
the relative weight on output-gap variability in the loss function (2.2), and fulﬁlls 0 ≤ c(λ) < 1,
with c(0) = 0 and c(∞) ≡ limλ→∞ c(λ)=1 . M o r e o v e r ,πt+1,t denotes the central bank’s
one-period-ahead forecast of inﬂation, given by
πt+1,t = πt + αxxt + αzzt+1,t. (3.3)
This inﬂation forecast is predetermined in period t, so it is independent of the instrument it in
period t. (Under the assumption of symmetric information, the central-bank inﬂation forecast,
πt+1,t, coincides with private-sector inﬂation expectations, πt+1|t.)
The ﬁrst row of (3.1) is not so complex, being a simple Taylor-type rule, with intercept
¯ r+π∗, a positive response to the (predetermined) one-period-ahead forecast of the inﬂation gap,
πt+1,t−π∗,w i t hac o e ﬃcient above unity (since 1+(1−c)/αxβr > 1), and a positive response to
the output gap, with the coeﬃcient βx/βr. Given (3.3), this can also be expressed as a response
to the current inﬂation gap, πt − π∗,w i t hac o e ﬃcient above unity, which is in line with the
Taylor principle mentioned above.
However, the second row of (3.1) shows the optimal response to judgment, which is quite
complex even for this simple model. Of course, with the simplifying assumption that the devia-
tion is an AR(1) process, the second row would be simpler and consist of a response to the vector
23 The coeﬃcient c is the smaller root of the characteristic equation of the diﬀerence equation, (A.9), resulting
from the model and the ﬁrst-order conditions.
15zt,t, still with a rather complex coeﬃcient. But, as argued above, such a simplifying assumption
is totally unwarranted for any realistic form of judgment.24
3.2 The forward-looking model
For the forward-looking model, appendix B, equation (B.15), shows that the optimal interest-
rate decision and announcement in period t for the interest rate in period t +1 ,it+1,t,i sg i v e n
by
it+1,t = r∗













)c{[1 − δc(1 − c)]αz˜ zt+2,t − (1 − c)αzzt+1,t}. (3.5)
As shown in appendix B, equation (B.7), the optimal policy has no average inﬂation bias, so
average inﬂation equals the inﬂation target,
π = π∗. (3.6)
The coeﬃcient c in (3.5), given by (A.10) and (B.11), although not identical to that in (3.1),
is still also an increasing function of λ, c(λ), that fulﬁlls 0 ≤ c(λ) < 1, with c(0) = 0 and
c(∞) ≡ limλ→∞ c(λ) = 1. Furthermore, ˜ zt+2,t is deﬁned as in (3.2) (for τ = 2), although with
the new coeﬃcient c(λ).
Thus, for the forward-looking model, the optimal reaction function is diﬀerent from a Taylor
rule. Instead, it corresponds to a response to the central bank’s forecast of the Wicksellian real
interest rate, r∗
t+1,t, with a unit coeﬃcient, a response to the lagged forecast of the output gap,
xt,t−1, and a quite complex response to judgment. The response to the lagged forecast of the
output gap illustrates that the optimal reaction function under commitment involves responses
to lagged states of the economy, what is called “history dependence” in Woodford [115].25 In
a forward-looking model, such history-dependence has a beneﬁcial impact on private-sector
expectations.
24 In the unrealistic case of strict inﬂation targeting, λ =0 ,w eh a v ec(λ)=c(0) = 0, and the optimal reaction
function becomes















(which corresponds to (3.1) with c(λ) = 0, when we use the convention that 0
0 = 1). Thus, we see how the
optimal instrument rate should respond to the one-period-ahead forecast of the inﬂation gap, πt+1,t − π
∗,t h e
current output gap, xt, the one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of the exogenous variable, zt+1,t and zt+2,t.E v e n
i nt h es i m p l ec a s eo fs t r i c ti n ﬂation targeting, judgment matters (in the form of the one- and two-period-ahead
forecasts of the deviation).
25 We note that the response to the lagged output-gap forcast can be of either sign, depending on whether λ is
g r e a t e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nαx/βr.







Thus, (3.7) can be substituted into (3.5), in which case the optimal reaction function can be
written as a complex response to current and previous judgment, in addition to the one-to-one
response to the forecast of the Wicksellian real interest rate.
With forward-looking variables, the optimal reaction function is not time-consistent, and each
period the central bank has an incentive to temporarily depart from it. Thus, a commitment
mechanism and corresponding veriﬁability of the reaction function is necessary. However, even
in this exceedingly simple model of the transmission mechanism, the optimal reaction function
is quite complex, especially with regard to judgment, and certainly impossible to verify.26
3.3 A commitment to the optimal instrument rule is impracticable
For several reasons, the direct optimal-control approach with a once-and-for-all calculation of
the optimal reaction function and then a commitment to this reaction function is completely
impracticable. Indeed, this conclusion seems to be part of the conventional wisdom, and a
commitment to an optimal instrument rule has no advocates, as far as I know. We have already
seen that, even in these two very simple models, the optimal reaction functions are quite complex,
as soon as there is a role for deviations from the simple model and judgment of those deviations.
This complexity makes veriﬁability impossible, although veriﬁability is necessary as soon as
there is a time-consistency problem and an incentive to temporarily depart from the optimal
reaction function. In more realistic models, the complexity increases dramatically further. The
optimal reaction function indeed requires that every conceivable contingency can be anticipated,
which is clearly impossible.
There are also more fundamental problems with the idea of a once-and-for-all commitment.
If this commitment is possible in a particular period, what is special with that period? Why
didn’t the commitment occur in a previous period, leaving no possibility to recommitment this
period? Woodford [113] has provided an ingenious solution to that problem, by proposing a more










Under strict inﬂation targeting, there is no problem with time-consistency (because there is no tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation- and output-gap stability). The optimal reaction function still involves response to judgment for one and
two periods ahead.
17sophisticated kind of commitment, “in a timeless perspective.” This involves a commitment to
recommit only to reaction functions to which one would have preferred to commit oneself far
into the past. This is a commitment not to exploit the possibility of a one-time “surprise” at the
time of the recommitment. It allows optimal recommitment, for instance when new information
about the transmission mechanism arrives, without the disadvantage of the negative eﬀect on
expectations that the possibility of surprises otherwise induces.
But Woodford’s ingenious idea does not diminish the already overwhelming problem of
enforcement and veriﬁability of a commitment to a complex instrument rule. For practical
purposes, the direct optimal-control approach, with either a once-and-for-all commitment or
continuous recommitment in a timeless perspective, will only be a theoretical benchmark for
evaluation purposes. It is not a coincidence that no central bank has tried to implement this
approach. For a practical monetary-policy rule, we have to look elsewhere.
4 Commitment to a simple instrument rule
Let me start by specifying the idea of a commitment to a simple instrument rule. The ﬁrst step
is to consider a restricted class of reaction functions, namely where the instrument is a function
only of a particular small subset, ¯ It, of the central bank’s information, It,
it = f(¯ It).
Typically, the instrument is restricted to be a linear function of the target variables (inﬂation
and (estimates of) the output gap) and the lagged instrument, which results in a Taylor-type
rule with interest-rate smoothing. Then the reaction function is
it = ¯ f + fπ(πt − π∗)+fxxt + fiit−1, (4.1)
where the constant ¯ f and the coeﬃcients fπ, fx and fi remain to be determined. The Taylor
rule, (1.1), is the best known special case. In the realistic situation when inﬂation and the
output gap are predetermined, (4.1) makes the instrument a simple function of predetermined
variables, called an explicit instrument rule in Rudebusch and Svensson [78], Svensson [88] and
Svensson and Woodford [96].
Once the class of reaction functions is determined, the second step is to determine the
numerical values of its parameters; for the case of (4.1), the constant ¯ f and the coeﬃcients fπ,
fx and fi). The coeﬃcients can either be chosen so that the reaction function minimizes the
18intertemporal loss function (2.1) for a particular model (is optimal for a given model and the
given class of reaction functions), or such that it performs reasonably well for a few alternative
models (is “robust” over a class of models).27
For the backward-looking model above, one simple instrument rule is just to forget about
the judgment part in (3.1) and instead follow the reaction function










As noted, this is a variant of the Taylor rule, with the predetermined one-period ahead forecast
of the inﬂation gap entering instead of the current inﬂation gap. Using the expression of the in-
ﬂation forecast in (3.3), but disregarding the judgment part of (3.3), results in the corresponding
simple reaction function of current inﬂation and output gaps,
















For the forward-looking model above, the obvious corresponding reaction function that disre-
gards judgment in (3.5) would be
it+1,t = r∗






c(1 − c)xt,t−1. (4.4)
In this case, the obvious simple reaction function diﬀers from the Taylor rule. Also, arguably it
is not so simple, since it responds to the one-period-ahead forecast of the Wicksellian natural
interest rate, which may be diﬃcult to estimate in practice. Furthermore, it responds to the
previous one-period-ahead output-gap forecast rather than the current output gap (estimate).
All this makes it less simple and also less easy to verify.28
The third step, ﬁnally, is for the central bank to commit to the particular simple instrument
rule chosen and then follow it ever after, or at least until there is a recommitment to a new
instrument rule. More precisely, once the simple instrument rule has been speciﬁed, the central
bank’s decision process is exceedingly simple.
In the backward-looking model, if the central bank has speciﬁed the form (4.3) of the simple
instrument rule, the decision-making process thereafter can be described as follows: (1) Collect
data on current inﬂation and current output. (2) Estimate potential output (which as noted
27 The contributions to the conference volume edited by Taylor, [103], provide many examples on commitment
to alternative simple instrument rules; see especially the introduction by Taylor [101]. The dominance of this
approach in current research is indicated by the fact that, in this volume, only Rudebusch and Svensson [78] also
consider targeting rules.
28 Also, recall that the response to the lagged output-gap forcast can be of either sign, cf. footnote 25.
19above is a nontrivial step) and then subtract from output to get the current output gap. (3) Use
(4.3) to calculate it. (4) Announce and implement it. (5) In the next period, start over again.
If the central bank has speciﬁed the form (4.2) of the simple instrument rule, the decision-
making process is somewhat more elaborate after (2): (3) One alternative is to be sophisticated,
form the judgment zt+1,t, and use this together with current inﬂation and the output gap to form
πt+1,t according to (3.3). Another alternative is to be unsophisticated, disregard any judgment,
and use only current inﬂation and the output gap in (3.3) to form πt+1,t. In the former case,
there is still some partial role for judgment, in the latter not. (4) Use πt+1,t and xt in (4.2) to
calculate it. (5) Announce and implement it. (6) In the next period, start over again.
In the forward-looking model, the steps are as follows: (1) Construct a one-period-ahead
forecast of the Wicksellian natural interest rate, r∗
t+1,t. This is a nontrivial step, comparable
to estimating potential output. (2) Recall the one-period-ahead output-gap forecast from the
previous period, xt,t−1.( 3 )U s er∗
t+1,t and xt+1,t in (4.4) to calculate it+1,t. (4) Construct the
one-period-ahead output-gap forecast, xt+1,t, to be used in the interest-rate decision next period.
This is a nontrivial step; it involves combining (5.5), (5.6) and (4.4) to solve for the resulting
output-gap forecast. (5) Announce it+1,t.( 6 )I np e r i o dt + 1, implement it+1 = it+1,t and start
over again.
The fact that the simple instrument rule (4.4) relies on the lagged one-period-ahead output-
gap forecast, and the fact that constructing this is not so easy, makes this simple instrument rule
still somewhat complex. A simpler instrument rule would be to follow a Taylor-type rule with
interest-rate smoothing, (4.1). As discussed in Svensson and Woodford [96], as long as fπ > 1s o
the Taylor principle is upheld, this results in a unique equilibrium in the forward-looking model,
although the Taylor-type rule will result in a worse outcome (a larger value of the loss function
(2.1)) than (4.4). In this case, the decision process would be the same simple one as for the
backward-looking model with the instrument rule (4.2).
4.1 Advantages of a commitment to a simple instrument rule
The advantages of a commitment to a simple instrument rule are that (1) the simplicity of the
instrument rule makes commitment technically feasible, and (2) simple instrument rules may be
relatively robust.
Suﬃcient simplicity of the instrument rule, for instance, if it is restricted to be a Taylor-
type rule with interest-rate smoothing like (4.1), implies that it is easily veriﬁable. Then, a
20commitment is, in principle, feasible.
Some research indicates that a Taylor-type rule with interest-rate smoothing is relatively
robust, in the sense that it performs tolerably well for a variety of models. This idea of robust
simple instrument rules has been promoted and examined in several papers by McCallum and
recently restated in McCallum [65]. Results of Levin, Williams and Wieland [57] for a set
of models of the U.S. economy indicate that a Taylor-type reaction function with interest-rate
smoothing may be relatively robust in this sense. Intuitively, in (almost) closed-economy models
where future inﬂation and the output gap mainly depend linearly on current inﬂation, the output
gap and the instrument rate, a Taylor-type instrument rule with the right coeﬃcients will be
optimal or close to optimal (as is for instance the case in the backward-model above, in the
absence of any deviations). The models examined by Levin, Williams and Wieland [57] are all
of this type, as is the model used in Rudebusch and Svensson [78]. On the other hand, even
for such a restricted class of reaction functions (where the Federal funds rate only depends on
the inﬂation gap, the output gap and the lagged Federal funds rate), there is still considerable
variation in the suggested magnitudes for the three coeﬃcients, as is apparent from the papers
in Taylor [103]. Thus, there is far from general agreement on what the precise coeﬃcients
should be. Furthermore, the simulations providing evidence of robustness of Taylor-type rules
all disregard the role of judgment.
4.2 Problems of a commitment to a simple instrument rule
The problems with the idea of a commitment to a simple instrument rule include that (1) the
simple instrument rule may be far from optimal in some circumstances, (2) there is no room for
judgmental adjustments and extra-model information, (3) desired development of the instrument
rule due to learning and new information will conﬂict with the commitment, unless sophisticated
and (arguably) unrealistic recommitment “in a timeless perspective”, as suggested by Woodford
[113], is allowed, and (4) in spite of all the academic work and promotion, no central bank has
actually chosen to do it, and prominent central bankers scoﬀ at the idea.
A ﬁrst obvious problem for a Taylor-type rule, with or without interest-rate smoothing, is
that, if there are other important state variables than inﬂation and the output gap, it will not
be optimal. For a large and not so open economy as the U.S., inﬂation and the output gap
may be the most important state variables, and the eﬃciency loss in not responding to other
variables may in many cases be moderate (as seems to be the case for the models examined by
21Levin, Wieland and Williams [57]). For a smaller and more open economy, the real exchange
rate, the terms of trade, foreign output and the foreign interest rate seem to be the minimum
essential state variables that have to be added (see, for instance, Svensson [90]), increasing the
number of response coeﬃcients that must be ﬁxed. I am not aware of any agreed-upon levels of
the response coeﬃcients for these variables.
With forward-looking variables, the optimal reaction function is characterized by history-
dependence, as has been emphasized by Woodford [115] and as was demonstrated in (3.5) and
(3.7). The lack of history-dependence may seem to be a problem for a simple instrument rule.
However, any response to the lagged instrument rate implies some history dependence, since









i [fπ(πt−j − π∗)+fxxt−j]. (4.5)
Thus, a suitable choice of the coeﬃcient fi may allow some approximation to the optimal history
dependence and, as further discussed in Woodford [115], partly remedy this problem.
A second problem is that a commitment to an instrument rule does not leave any room
for judgmental adjustments and extra-model information, made explicit by the inclusion of the
deviation zt and the central-bank judgment zt above. As I believe most students of practical
monetary policy would agree with, practical monetary policy cannot (at least not yet) rely on
models only. As further discussed in Svensson [93], the use of judgmental adjustments and extra-
model information is both desirable in principle and unavoidable in practice. For instance, when
a rare event, like a stock market crash, an Asian crisis or the ﬂoating of the Brazilian real occurs,
central bankers may have to use their judgments rather than their models in assessing its likely
eﬀect on future inﬂation and output. Given the lags in the eﬀects of monetary policy, it will be
eﬃcient to respond to such an event before it shows up in the variables that enter the simple
instrument rule, like current GDP and inﬂation. Indeed, Taylor [100] to a large extent discusses
the Fed’s departures from the Taylor rule and their reasons. Put diﬀerently, a commitment to
a simple instrument rule does not provide any rules for when discretionary departures from the
simple instrument rule are warranted.
A third problem with simple instrument rules would seem to be that a once-and-for-all
commitment to an instrument rule would not allow any improvement of the instrument rule
when new information about the transmission mechanism, the variability of shocks, or the source
of shocks arrives.29 A once-and-for-all commitment also faces the problem of an incentive to
29 For a linear model of the transmission mechanism and a quadratic loss function, certainty-equivalence applies
22exploit the initial situation, for instance, by temporarily increasing output by an initial surprise
inﬂation, and letting the simple reaction function apply only in the future. As a solution to the
problem of once-and-for-all commitments, Woodford [113] has, as discussed above in section 3.3,
suggested repeated recommitment “in a timeless perspective” to new revised instrument rules
when new information arrives. The timeless perspective is a self-imposed restriction to consider
only long-run instrument rules that do not depend on the period when the commitment is made,
and by construction it eliminates any exploitation of the initial situation.30 Presumably, though,
such recommitment to a new instrument rule would have to occur relatively infrequently and
only after substantial accumulated information has arrived. Nevertheless, recommitment to new
long-run instrument rules is at least a logically possible (and theoretically elegant) solution to
the problem of once-and-for-all commitment.
Of course, along the lines of Woodford’s recommitment in a timeless perspective, the central
bankers faced with an Asian crisis could ask: Suppose that in the past, when we designed
our current instrument rule, we had anticipated the possibility of a future Asian crisis. What
response to the crisis would we then have committed ourselves to? Answering this question
would amount to revising the simple instrument rule by incorporating this particular event.
Undertaking a substantial revision of the instrument rule may not make much sense unless the
same event is expected to occur reasonably frequently in the future, though. It would also seem
to require that the event is somehow incorporated in the models used to derive the optimal
simple instrument rule. However, if the central bank tries to incorporate too many possible
events, the instrument rule would no longer be simple, and veriﬁcation of the bank’s adherence
to the rule becomes increasingly diﬃcult. Furthermore, there could be times when a relatively
swift response is called for, without leaving much time for a thorough revision of the instrument
rule. It seems that we still lack rules for when departures from the simple instrument rule are
called for, without which the simple rule is either incomplete or ineﬃcient.
Suppose a central bank went ahead and wanted to implement a commitment to a simple
instrument rule? How would it actually commit itself to the instrument rule? One extreme
possibility would be to have the Central Bank Act (or, in New Zealand, the Policy Targets
Agreement (PTA), see Svensson [91]) include the instrument rule in a veriﬁable way (and also
for the optimal reaction function. That is, the reaction function does not depend on the variance of the shocks.
Certainty-equivalence does not apply for simple reaction functions, so the coeﬃcients of the optimal simple reaction
function do depend on the variance of the shocks (see Currie and Levine [27]).
30 The idea of commitment in a timeless perspective is worked out by Woodford [113] for optimal reaction
functions rather than simple ones (the model used is so simple that the optimal reaction function is quite simple).
23specify suitable sanctions for departures from the rule), with revisions of the law when new
information calls for revisions of the instrument rule. A less extreme possibility would be an
Instrument-Rule Report (rather than the Inﬂation Reportsi s s u e db ym a n yi n ﬂation-targeting
central banks), where the central bank presents its derivation and motivation of the current
instrument rule, solemnly commits itself to follow it, and invites external scrutiny of its adherence
to the rule (and criticism and embarrassment if it departs from the rule). The rule would then be
in eﬀect until a new issue of the Instrument-Rule Report presents and motivates a new revision
of the rule. Revisions would probably have to be rather infrequent to limit the amount of
discretion.
The decision-making process inside the central bank would then be quite uneven. The
infrequent revisions of the rule would be highly active and demanding periods, using all the
bank’s intellectual capacity. During the presumably long periods in-between, monetary policy
could be conducted by a clerk with a hand calculator, or even a pre-programmed computer.
Furthermore, the central bank would be forward-looking only at the time when it reconsiders
and recommits to a new instrument rule; in-between it would not be forward-looking but behave
in a completely mechanical way.
Thus, an obvious fourth problem is that commitment to a simple instrument rule is far
from an accurate description of current monetary policy, inﬂation targeting or other. Such
a monetary-policy setup does not exist in the current inﬂation-targeting countries, nor has it
ever existed before. No central bank has (to my knowledge) announced and committed itself
to an explicit instrument rule. No central bank has issued anything similar to an Instrument-
Rule Report. Nor does there seem to be any attempt to construct a commitment mechanism,
whereby a central bank would be obliged to follow a mechanical instrument rule. In spite of the
impressive academic work on a commitment to a simple instrument rule, I doubt that we will
ever see such an arrangement materialize. Certainly, prominent current and previous central
bankers seem skeptical and maintain that some amount of discretion is inevitable. As Blinder
[11, p. 49] puts it,
Rarely does society solve a time-consistency problem by rigid precommitment... En-
lightened discretion is the rule.
As stated by King [51],
Mechanical policy rules are not credible... No rule could be written down that
describes how policy would be set in all possible outcomes. Some discretion is in-
24evitable. But that discretion must be constrained by a clear objective to which policy
is directed...
As expressed by Bernanke and Mishkin [8]:
Inﬂation targeting does not represent [a commitment to] an ironclad policy rule...
Instead, inﬂation targeting is better understood as a policy framework...
But do not simple instrument rules ﬁt actual central-bank behavior well? Several researchers,
for instance, Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [24] and Judd and Rudebusch [48], have found that
variants of Taylor-type rules with interest-rate smoothing ﬁt U.S. data reasonably well. The
interpretation of this ﬁnding is not obvious, though. First, the similarity of the outcome of
policy decisions with a simple instrument rule is completely consistent with the forward-looking
goal-directed behavior by the central bank, say in the form of discretionary period-by-period
optimization, in a situation where inﬂation and the output gap are important state variables.
That is, the simple instrument rule is a reduced form rather than a primitive, the endogenous
end point rather than the exogenous starting point of monetary policy. Second, even the best
empirical ﬁts leave one third or more of the variance of changes in the federal funds rate un-
explained.31 Thus, departures from the simple instrument rules are substantial and ask for an
explanation.
4.3 A simple instrument rule as a “guideline”
As discussed above, a ﬁrm commitment to a simple instrument rule is associated with a number
of problems, and it has, for apparently good reasons, never been tried out in the real world.
However, another interpretation of the role of simple instrument rules is as a much looser com-
mitment: An instrument rule should not be followed mechanically; instead it should be seen as a
“benchmark” or a “guideline” for assessing instrument-rate decisions. This is the interpretation
and use of policy rules that Taylor himself has proposed for the Taylor rule, for instance in the
classic article [100] proposing the Taylor rule, and, in more detail, in [105].
Taylor [105, p. 443] deﬁnes a “monetary policy rule” as “simply a contingency plan that
speciﬁes as clearly as possible the circumstances under which a central bank should change
the instruments of monetary policy” and mentions the Taylor rule as an example. Thus, his
31 Judd and Rudebusch [48], for instance, estimate reaction functions for t h eF e d e r a lR e s e r v eS y s t e md u r i n g
the terms of Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan. The best ﬁt is for Greenspan’s term (sample
1987:1—1997:4) and the partial-adjustment form ∆it = γ(i
∗
t − it−1)+ρ∆it−1,w h e r ei
∗
t is given by a Taylor-type
rule, i
∗
t = ¯ f + fπ(πt − π
∗)+fy(yt − y
∗). The best adjusted R
2 is 0.67.
25deﬁnition of monetary policy rules is restricted to include instrument rules only. Furthermore,
as to the use of such monetary policy rules, he states, [105, p. 445—446]:
[J]ust because monetary policy rules can be written down as a mechanical-looking
mathematical equation does not imply that central banks should follow them me-
chanically.
To the contrary, most proposals for monetary policy rules suggest that the rules
be used as guidelines, or general policy frameworks... Because some discretion is
needed to implement the policy rule, the mathematical form becomes an approxima-
tion, much like the simplifying assumptions that underlie the models that are used
for policy evaluation... [D]espite the mathematical form, I proposed this rule [the
Taylor rule] in the early 1990s as a benchmark or guideline for assessing interest rate
decisions. At a minimum, discretion is needed to assess monthly data on commodity
prices, employment, industrial production and other variables, in order to estimate
(or predict) the current quarterly inﬂation rate and the output gap.
Moreover, there will, on occasion, be a need to change the interest rate because of
some special factor that cannot be included in the policy rule. Liquidity crises in
ﬁnancial markets will usually require such discretion. The 1987 stock market break
in the United States is one example. Before the stock market break of 1987, the Fed
was increasing the federal funds rate, apparently because inﬂation and the output
gap were increasing. But when liquidity became a concern after the break in the
market, the Fed lowered the interest rate and thereby provided more liquidity. After
the liquidity concerns dissipated, the Fed returned to its tightening mode. By doing
so it was able to contain the rise in inﬂation much earlier than in similar periods in
the 1970s. It is important to point out that such discretionary actions are relative to
the benchmark policy rule–the Taylor rule in this example. Hence, even with these
discretionary actions the policy rule has substantive content for the decisions.
I believe this quote leads to some hard questions about the idea of a simple instrument rule
as a guideline. First, the discretion mentioned about using available information to estimate
current quarterly inﬂation and output gap concerns constructing the given arguments of the
Taylor rule, not the Taylor rule itself, the reaction function. Thus, this is not actually an
example of a deviation from the instrument rule. Second, the quote states that deviations from
the instrument rule will be needed “on occasion” because of some special factor (other than the
inﬂation and output gap included in the rule). The one example given in this quote is liquidity
crises in ﬁnancial markets, more precisely the 1987 stock market break. In Taylor [100], two other
examples of reasons for deviation from the rule is given: the oil-price shock after Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait in late 1990, and the increase in long interest rates in early 1990, possibly related to
anticipations of German uniﬁcation and related increased ﬁscal expenditure and investment in
Germany. These examples seems to refer to rather big and rare events. Does this mean that the
instrument rule should be followed mechanically except when similar big events occur? If so,
26this would seem to imply that it should be followed mechanically most of the time, since such
big events (fortunately) are relatively rare.
More generally, I ﬁnd the idea of a simple instrument rule as a mere guideline not suﬃciently
speciﬁct ob eo p e r a t i o n a l .W h e ns h a l lt h er u l eb ef ollowed, and when not? More precisely, there
are no rules for when deviations from the instrument rule are appropriate.T h i ss e e m st oc r e a t e
an inherent lack of transparency. How can outside observers then judge whether a deviation is
appropriate or not?
Nevertheless, one could possibly imagine a central bank announcing that “we are going to use
the following explicit instrument rule as our guideline, and we will carefully explain and motivate
any deviation from the rule.” But so far, no central bank has announced any instrument rule as
a guideline.
Still, the fact that historical examples of successful policy are similar to variants of simple
instrument rules, the fact that variants of simple instrument rules perform reasonably well in
a variety of diﬀerent models, together with the fact that they can be derived as optimal in
some circumstances (for instance, in the backward-looking model above in the absence of any
deviation) imply that these simple instrument rules can serve a useful role as rough guidelines,
in that large departures from them have better to have good explanations. But they are not
more than very rough guidelines. They are not suﬃcient as rules for good monetary policy.
Thus, although alternative instrument rules can serve as very rough guidelines,32 and deci-
sions ex post may sometimes be similar to those prescribed by the simple instrument rules, a
commitment to a simple instrument rule (even with Woodford’s recommitment in a timeless per-
spective) does not seem to be a realistic substitute for the forward-looking decision framework
applied by inﬂation-targeting central banks. Indeed, instead of making infrequent forward-
looking decisions at the time of the infrequent recommitment to a new simple instrument rule,
it seems that central banks instead choose to be continuously forward-looking and have a regular
cycle of decision-making. To quote Greenspan [40, p. 244],
Implicit in any monetary policy action or inaction, is an expectation of how the
future will unfold, that is, a forecast.
The belief that some formal set of rules for policy implementation can eﬀectively
eliminate that problem is, in my judgment, an illusion. There is no way to avoid
making a forecast, explicitly or implicitly.33
32 See, for instance, the contributions in Taylor [103] and, with regard to the performance of a Taylor rule for
the Eurosystem, Gerlach and Schnabel [35], Peersman and Smets [71] and Taylor [104].
33 Budd [16], which alerted me to this quote, contains an illuminating and detailed discussion of the advantages of
explicitly considering forecasts rather than specifying reaction functions from observed variables to the instrument.
27Therefore, I will turn, in section 5, to a, in my mind, better way of describing current inﬂation
targeting, namely as a commitment to a targeting rule, more precisely, a “forecast-targeting
rule.” Before that, I will comment on a particular instrument rule that has been suggested as
an alternative to Taylor-type rules, namely so-called “forecast-based” instrument rules, which
sometimes is considered (misleadingly, in my mind) corresponding to “inﬂation-forecast target-
ing”.
4.4 A commitment to a “forecast-based” instrument rule
A particular class of reaction functions involves the instrument rate responding to a T-period-
ahead inﬂation forecast, of the form
it = ¯ f + fπ(πt+T,t − π∗)+fiit−1. (4.6)
This class of reaction functions has been referred to as forecast-based (instrument) rules and
is promoted by, for instance, Batini and Haldane [4]. Variants of it are used in the Quarterly
Projection Model (QPM) of Bank of Canada, [26], Black, Macklem and Rose [10], and the Fore-
casting and Policy System (FPS) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, [9]. For a forecast-horizon
T suﬃciently long, the inﬂation forecast is no longer predetermined but depends on the instru-
ment. For such a horizon, the forecast in most applications have been taken to be an equilibrium,
or “rule-consistent,” forecast, meaning that it is an endogenous rational-expectations forecast
conditional on an intertemporal equilibrium of the model. Thus, this reaction function is really
an equilibrium condition that has to be satisﬁed by simultaneously determined variables. This is
called an implicit instrument rule in Rudebusch and Svensson [78], Svensson [88] and Svensson
and Woodford [96].
The reaction function (4.6) is sometimes said to represent “inﬂation-forecast targeting”; a
more precise and consistent terminology is “responding to an inﬂation forecast.” In this paper,
as in Rogoﬀ [74], Walsh [111], Svensson [85] and [88], Rudebusch and Svensson [78], Cecchetti
[19] and [20], Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [25] and Svensson and Woodford [96], “targeting variable
Yt” means minimizing a loss function that is increasing in the deviation between the variable
and a target.34 In contrast, in some of the literature “targeting variable Yt” refers to a reaction
function where the instrument responds to the same deviation. As discussed in Svensson [88,
34 This is completely in line with Tinbergen’s [106] classic treatment, where a “target variable” is deﬁned as
a variable that enters the objective function and a “target” is the value of a target variable that optimizes the
objective function.
28section 2.4], these two meanings of “targeting variable Yt” are not equivalent. The reason is
that it is generally better (in the sense of minimizing the loss function) that the instrument
responds to the determinants of the target variables than to the target variables themselves (for
instance, even if inﬂation is the only target variable (the only variable in the loss function), it is
generally better to respond to both current inﬂation and the output gap, when both these are
determinants of future inﬂation; see, for instance, Svensson [85], Rudebusch and Svensson [78],
and the optimal reaction function under strict inﬂation targeting (3.4) in footnote 24). Note
also that, in the forward-looking model, the optimal reaction function (3.5) does not respond to
any of the current target variables but to their determinants. Thus, it seems advisable not to
confuse “responding to variable Yt” with “targeting variable Yt.”
Above, simple instrument rules were criticized for, among other things, not taking judgment
into account. However, the forecast-based instrument rule of the form (4.6) seems less sensitive to
criticism on this point. The equilibrium forecast that enters the rule can in principle incorporate
all relevant information, in particular, the judgment, zt. Nevertheless, it is unsuitable for other
reasons. A ﬁrst reason, as already noted, is that it is (when responding to equilibrium forecasts)
an equilibrium condition rather than an operational explicit reaction function of predetermined
variables. Still, it could be a desirable equilibrium condition. More precisely, it could be a
desirable speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e , a reformulated ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy.35 A
second reason is then that, unfortunately, the forecast-based instrument rule of the form (4.6) is
not an optimal targeting rule for the conventional loss function (2.1) with (2.2). As explained in
some detail in Svensson [94], one can work backwards and ﬁnd the intertemporal loss function




[δT(πt+T,t − π∗)2 + λi(it −¯ ı)2 + λ∆i(it − it−1)2].
This loss function is such that, in each period, the central bank puts weight on both instrument-
rate stabilization and instrument-rate smoothing, λi > 0a n dλ∆i > 0 (that is, the instrument
rate has to be a separate target variable and enter the loss function directly, which, as noted in
section 5.6, is diﬃcult to rationalize). Furthermore, the central bank must be concerned with
stabilizing the inﬂation gap at a ﬁxed horizon T only. Thus, in contrast with the conventional
intertemporal loss function (2.1) with (2.2), the central bank does not consider any tradeoﬀ
35 Indeed, when (4.6) is used in in the QPM of the Bank of Canada [26] and the FPS of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand [9], the interest rate is a 3-month interest rate, which is strictly speaking not an instrument rate but
a market interest rate over which the central bank has less than perfect control. In that case, strictly speaking,
(4.6) is not an “instrument” rule or a “reaction function,” but a “targeting” rule.
29between inﬂation gaps at diﬀerent horizons. Indeed, the implied loss function for the forecast-
based instrument rule does not fulﬁll the minimum requirement of being time-consistent in the
classical sense of Strotz [84], and in any period the central bank will, with this loss function,
regret previous decisions made. In addition, the implied loss function does not incorporate any
concern for output-gap stability (except indirectly through the horizon T).
A third reason is that, in line with the above, as demonstrated by Levin, Wieland and
Williams [58], in simulations on diﬀerent macro models, the performance of this particular
forecast-based instrument rule, as long as it does not utilize quite short forecast horizons (making
the forecast virtually predetermined), is inferior and nonrobust, when evaluated according to
(2.1) with (2.2) or the special case (2.3). All together, the forecast-based instrument rule of the
form (4.6) is quite problematic, in spite of its entrenched position in the QPM of the Bank of
Canada [26] and the FPS of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand [9]. (See also the discussion in
section 5.5 below.)
However, arguably a reaction function when the instrument responds to the unchanged-
interest-rate forecasts (of both inﬂation and the output gap) make more sense and can be seen
as a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion (around an unchanged interest rate) of the optimal speciﬁct a r -
geting rules to be discussed below, even if the central bank does not have a separate instrument-
rate stabilization and/or smoothing objective, see appendix C below, equations (C.1) and (C.2),
as well as Jansson and Vredin [47] and Rudebusch and Svensson [78].
5 Commitment to a targeting rule
5.1 Generalizing monetary-policy rules
Thus, I ﬁnd that a commitment to a simple instrument rule is not a good description of current
inﬂation targeting, nor does the concept of instrument rules seem suﬃcient to discuss monetary-
policy rules. Instead, as argued in Svensson [88], the concept of monetary-policy rules needs to
be broadened.
In order to discuss alternative decision frameworks for monetary policy, it is practical to have
a consistent classiﬁcation of such decision frameworks. To repeat, as in Rudebusch and Svensson
[78], Svensson [88] and Svensson and Woodford [96], a “monetary-policy rule” is interpreted
broadly as a “prescribed guide for monetary-policy conduct.”36 This allows not only the narrow
36 Indeed, the ﬁrst deﬁnition of “rule” in Merriam-Webster [69] is “a prescribed guide for conduct or action.”
30“instrument rules” but also the broader, and arguably more relevant, “targeting rules”. In line
with Tinbergen [106], “target variables” are operational goal variables and variables that enter a
loss function, a function that is increasing in the distance of the target variables from prescribed
“targets” (target levels). “Targeting” is minimizing such a loss function.
A “general targeting rule” is a high-level speciﬁcation of a monetary-policy rule that speciﬁes
operational objectives, that is, the target variables, the targets and the loss function to be
minimized. A “speciﬁc targeting rule” is instead expressed directly as an operational condition
for the target variables (or for forecasts of the target variables).37
5.2 Forecast targeting
“Forecast targeting” refers to using forecasts of the target variables eﬀectively as intermediate
target variables, as in King’s [49] early characterization of inﬂation targeting, and means mini-
mizing a loss function where forecasts enter as arguments. Monetary policy aﬀects the economy
with considerable lags. Current inﬂation and output are, to a large extent, determined by previ-
ous decisions of ﬁrms and households. Normally, current monetary-policy actions can only aﬀect
the future levels of inﬂation and the output gap, in practice with substantial lags and with the
total eﬀects spread out over several quarters. This makes forecasts of the target variables crucial
in practical monetary policy.
37 Sims [80], while discussing the implications of the Lucas [59] critique for VAR studies, provides an early
endorsement of targeting rules rather than instrument rules (although without using these names). As an example
of monetary policy, he ﬁrst [80, p. 13] speciﬁes assumptions, under which “... the optimal form for macropolicy
will be stabilization of the price level.” He then continues (brackets denote my comments): “If we could agree on
a stable model in which all forms of shock to the aggregate price level were speciﬁed a priori, then it would be
easy in principle to specify an appropriate function mapping past values of observed macrovariables into current
levels of policy variables in such a way as to minimize price variance [that is, to specify the optimal instrument
rule]. However, if disturbances in the economy can originate in a variety of diﬀerent ways, the form of this policy
reaction function may be quite complicated. It is much easier simply to state that [the] policy rule is to minimize
the variance of the price level [that is, as a general targeting rule]. Furthermore, if there is uncertainty about the
structure of the economy, then even with a ﬁxed policy objective function, widely understood, the form of the
dependence of policy on observed history will shift over time as more is learned about (or as opinions shift about)
the structure of the economy. One could continually re-estimate the structure and, each period, re-announce an
explicit relation of policy variables to history [that is, re-announce the instrument rule]. However it is simpler
to announce the stable objective function once [that is, the general targeting rule] and then each period solve
only for this period’s policy variable values instead of computing a complete policy reaction function [that is,
the instrument rule need not be explicitly stated]. This is done by making conditional projections from the
best existing reduced from model, and picking the best-looking projected future time path [that is, by general
forecast targeting]. Policy choice is then most easily and reliably carried out by comparing the projected eﬀects
of alternative policies and picking the policy which most nearly holds the price level constant [that is, fulﬁlls the
speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e ] . ”
Summarizing the argument, Sims [80, p. 14] again states: “... an optimal policy regi m ea n dt h ep r e s e n tr e g i m e
in most countries are both most naturally speciﬁed in terms of the eﬀects of policy on the evolution of the economy
[that is, in terms of the targeting rule], rather than in terms of the nature of the dependence of policy on the
economy’s history [that is, in terms of the instrument rule].”
In consistency with this, reviewing the Taylor [103] conference volume, Sims also concludes [81, p. 566]: “It
seems to me that the call by RS [Rudebusch and Svensson [78]] for thinking about rules this way [as targeting
rules instead of instrument rules] is one of the most important ideas in the book.”
31Assume that the transmission mechanism is approximately linear, in the sense that the future
target variables depend linearly on the current state of the economy and the instrument (as in
the above examples of the two simple backward- and forward-looking models). Furthermore,
assume that any uncertainty about the transmission mechanism and the state of the economy
shows up as “additive” uncertainty about future target variables, in the sense that the degree
of uncertainty about future target variables only depends on the horizon but not on the current
state of the economy and the instrument setting. (This is the way the deviation enters in the
backward- and forward-looking models used above.) Finally, let the intertemporal loss function
be quadratic. It is then a standard result in optimal-control theory that so-called certainty-
equivalence applies, and that optimal policy need only focus on conditional mean forecasts
of the future target variables, forecasts conditional on the central bank’s current information
and a particular future path for the instrument.38 Since this means treating the forecasts as
(intermediate) target variables (that is, putting forecasts of the target variables in the loss
function), the procedure can be called “forecast targeting.”
This decision-making process in the central bank then involves making conditional forecasts
of inﬂation and the output gap, conditional on diﬀerent paths of the central bank’s instrument
rate, using all relevant information about the current and the future state of the economy
and the transmission mechanism.39 Then, the instrument-rate path is chosen, for which the
corresponding conditional forecasts minimize the intertemporal loss function, which, in practice,
means that the inﬂation forecast returns to the inﬂation target and that the corresponding
conditional output-gap forecast returnst oz e r oa ta na p p r o p r i a t ep a c e .I ft h ei n ﬂation forecast
is too high relative to the inﬂation target at the relevant horizon (but the output-gap forecast
is acceptable), the instrument-rate path needs to be raised; if the conditional inﬂation forecast
is too low, the instrument-rate path needs to be lowered. The chosen instrument-rate path is
then the basis for the current instrument setting. In regular decision cycles, the procedure is
then repeated. If no new signiﬁcant information has arrived, the forecasts and the instrument-
rate path are the same, and instrument-rate setting follows the same instrument-rate path.
(The time-consistency problem that arises when there are forward-looking variables is further
discussed below.) If new signiﬁcant information has arrived, the forecasts and the instrument-
38 For proof of the certainty-equivalence theorem for optimal-control theory, see Chow [21] for models with
predetermined variables only and Currie and Levine [27] for models with both predetermined and forward-looking
variables.
39 See Brash [13] and Svensson [91] for a discussion of the decision-making process of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, which provides a prime example of forecast targeting.
32rate path are updated. This is essentially the procedure recommended by Blinder [11] and
referred to as “dynamic programming” and “proper dynamic optimization.” Compared to many
other intertemporal decision problems that households, ﬁrms and investors solve one way or
another (usually without the assistance of a sizeable staﬀ of PhDs in economics), this particular
decision problem is, in principle, not overly complicated or diﬃcult.
Forecast targeting requires that the central bank has a view of what the policy multipliers
are, that is, how instrument-rate adjustments aﬀect the conditional inﬂation and output-gap
forecasts. But it does not imply that forecasts must be exclusively model-based. Instead, it
allows for extra-model information and judgmental adjustments, as well as very partial infor-
mation about the current state of the economy. It basically allows for any information that is
relevant for the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts.
5.3 A commitment to a general forecast-targeting rule
L e tm eb em o r es p e c i ﬁc. Let it = {it+τ,t}∞
τ=0 denote an instrument plan in period t.C o n -
ditional on the central bank’s information in period t, It (including its view of the transmis-
sion mechanism, etc.), and its judgment, zt, and conditional on alternative instrument plans
it, consider alternative (mean) forecasts for inﬂation, πt = {πt+τ,t}∞
τ=0, and the output gap,
xt = {xt+τ,t}∞
τ=0 (consisting of the diﬀerence between yt, the (mean) output forecast, and y∗t,
the (mean) potential-output forecast). That is, πt+τ,t =E [ πt+τ |it,I t,zt], etc.40 Furthermore,
consider the intertemporal loss function in period t applied to the forecasts of the target vari-












B yac o m m i t m e n tt oageneral forecast-targeting rule, I mean a commitment to minimize a
loss function over forecasts of the target variables. For an intertemporal quadratic loss function
like (5.1), in principle this requires that the inﬂation target, π∗, the relative weight on output-
gap stabilization, λ, and the discount factor, δ, are speciﬁed. In practice, the loss function is not
speciﬁed in this detail, and the central bank has some discretion over the translation of the stated
40 Constructing conditional forecasts in a backward-looking model (that is, a model without forward-looking
variables) is straightforward. Constructing such forecasts in a forward-looking model raises some speciﬁcd i f -
ﬁculties, which are explained and resolved in the appendix of the working-paper version of Svensson [88]. The
conditional forecasts for an arbitrary int e r e s t - r a t ep a t hd e r i v e dt h e r ea s s u m et h a tt h ei n t e r e s t - r a t ep a t h sa r e“ c r e d -
ible”, that is, anticipated and allowed to inﬂuence the forward-looking variables. Leeper and Zha [55] present an
alternative way of constructing forecasts for arbitrary interest-rate paths, by assuming that these interest-rate
paths result from unanticipated deviations from a normal reaction function.
33objectives into a loss function, for instance, how the Reserve Bank of New Zealand interprets the
PTA (see Svensson [91]).41 Each period t, conditional on the central bank’s forecasting model,
information It and judgment zt, the bank then ﬁnds the combination of forecasts and instrument
plan that minimizes (5.1), the optimal forecasts and instrument plan, denoted (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt), and
then makes the current instrument decision according to the current optimal instrument plan
(the current instrument decision will be given by ˆ ıt,t in the backward-looking model and ˆ ıt+1,t
in the forward-looking model).
As stated, this decision-making process implies discretionary minimization each period of
aw e l l - d e ﬁned intertemporal loss function. The process will result in an endogenous reaction
function for the current instrument decision, a function F(It,zt) of the central bank’s informa-
tion and judgment. This reaction function need not be speciﬁed explicitly, and it need not be
followed mechanically. For a model without forward-looking variables, the resulting endogenous
instrument-setting will follow the optimal reaction function derived under the direct optimal-
control approach discussed above. For a model with forward-looking variables, this decision-
making process will result in a diﬀerent reaction function than the optimal one, to be further
discussed below.
More precisely, how does the central bank ﬁnd the optimal forecasts and instrument plan?
One possibility is that, conditional on the information It and the judgment zt, the central bank
staﬀ generates a set of alternative forecasts (πt,x t) for a set of alternative instrument plans it.
This way, the staﬀ constructs the “feasible set” of forecasts and instrument plans. The decision-
making body of the central bank then selects the combination of forecasts that “looks best,” in
the sense of achieving the best compromise between stabilizing the inﬂation gap and stabilizing
the output gap, that is, implicitly minimizes (5.1).
5.3.1 The backward-looking model
In the backward-looking model, the central bank’s forecasting model in period t will be given by
(2.4)—(2.6), where the corresponding forecasts are substituted for actual values (and forecasts of
the shocks are set equal to zero),
πt+τ+1,t = πt+τ,t+ αxxt+τ,t+ αzzt+τ+1,t, (5.2)
xt+τ+1,t = βxxt+τ,t+ βzzt+τ+1,t − βr(it+τ,t− πt+τ+1,t − ¯ r), (5.3)
41 In Svensson [92] and [95], I argue that the time has come for central banks to announce explicit loss functions,
including the relative weight λ on output-gap stabilization.
34for τ ≥ 0. Thus, the forecasts fulﬁlling (5.2) and (5.3) are conditional on the central bank’s
judgment, zt ≡ {zt+τ,t}∞
τ=−∞, and alternative instrument plans, it. A si ss h o w ni na p p e n d i x
A, equation (A.5), a central bank minimizing the intertemporal loss function will implicitly be
satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =
λ
δαx
(δxt+τ+1,t − xt+τ,t) (5.4)
for τ ≥ 1. This is the implicit condition for forecasts of the inﬂation and output gaps “looking
good.” Combining (5.4) with (5.2) and (5.3) leads to the optimal forecasts and instrument path,
(ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt), and to the instrument-rate decision, ˆ ıt,t,e a c hp e r i o dt. This instrument-rate decision
will be consistent with (3.1), the complex optimal reaction function for this model. However, the
commitment to the general targeting rule means that the central bank never need to make this
reaction function explicit; instead it just repeatedly solves its optimization problem each period
and implements its instrument-rate decision. In particular, the instrument setting incorporates
the central bank’s judgment in an optimal way.
5.3.2 The forward-looking model
In the forward-looking model, the central bank’s forecasting model will be
πt+τ+1,t − π = δ(πt+τ+2,t − π)+αxxt+τ+1,t + αzzt+τ+1,t, (5.5)
xt+τ+1,t = xt+τ+2,t − βr(it+τ+1,t − πt+τ+2,t − r∗
t+τ+1,t)+βzzt+τ+1,t, (5.6)
for τ ≥ 0, given the central bank’s forecast of the natural real interest rate, r∗t ≡ {r∗
t+τ,t}∞
τ=0,
and its judgment zt. With forward-looking variables, straight-forward discretionary optimization
each period t of the loss function (5.1) encounters the time-consistency problem: Even in the
absence of any new information in period t + 1, the optimal instrument-rate setting in period
t + 1 will deviate from the optimal instrument-rate plan in period t.
Under the assumption that the central bank instead anticipates the result of future opti-
mization each period, time-consistency is assured. Appendix B then shows (equation (B.18)
for τ = 0), that the central bank will each period t set the instrument rate so as to implicitly
achieve the ﬁrst-order condition




Combining this ﬁrst-order condition with (5.5) will result in optimal forecasts, (ˆ πt, ˆ xt). Com-
bining these forecasts with (5.6) will result in the optimal instrument path, ˆ ıt.T h e o p t i m a l
35instrument-rate decision, it+1,t,i st h e ng i v e nb yit+1,t =ˆ ıt+1,t, which follows from combining
(5.6) for τ =0w i t hˆ xt+1,t,ˆ xt+2,t,ˆ πt+2,t, r∗
t+1,t and zt+1,t. The implied reaction function need
never be made explicit. It is shown in appendix B, equation (B.21), that the implied reaction
function is given by
it+1,t = r∗
t+1,t + π∗ +
˜ c
βrλ
[βrλ − αx(1 − δ˜ c)]αz˜ zt+2,t +
αx˜ cαzzt+1,t + λβzzt+1,t
βrλ
. (5.8)
This reaction function is clearly diﬀerent from the optimal reaction function, (3.5), although
there is still no average inﬂation bias (under the assumption that the unconditional mean of
the deviation is zero), so average inﬂation equals the inﬂation target and (3.6) holds.42 The
coeﬃcient ˜ c is diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient c of the optimal reaction function. It is still a







(see (B.20)). Moreover, ˜ zt+2,t is deﬁned as in (3.2), but with the coeﬃcient ˜ c substituted for c.
Thus, under discretionary forecast-targeting in the forward-looking model, the resulting in-
strument setting described by (5.8) will diﬀer from the optimal reaction function (3.5). This
illustrates that discretionary optimization results in stabilization bias (the response to shocks in
(5.8) is diﬀerent from that in (3.5)) and a lack of history-dependence (since there is no response
to previous shocks in (5.8)).
The reason why discretionary optimization does not result in the optimal outcome is that,
in the decision-period t − 1, an increase in the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast for t +1 ,
πt+1,t−1, increases the one-period-ahead forecast, πt,t−1,v i a( 5 . 5 )w h e nt − 1 is substituted for
t and τ = 1. However, in the decision-period t,t h ei n ﬂation forecast for t +1 ,πt+1,t,c a n
be increased without any eﬀect on inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt, since the latter is now predetermined.
Therefore, the tradeoﬀ (the marginal rate of transformation) involved in adjusting the inﬂation
forecast for t +1i sd i ﬀerent between decision periods t − 1a n dt.
5.3.3 A “commitment to continuity and predictability”
As discussed in Svensson and Woodford [96], a commitment to a modiﬁed general targeting
rule can solve the time-consistency problem and avoid the loss from discretionary optimization.
42 If the unconditional mean of the deviation is zero, it follows from (2.8) that the unconditional mean of the
output gap is zero, E[xt] = 0. Using this and taking the unconditional mean of (5.7) results in E[πt+1,t]=π
∗.
36More precisely, let Ξt,t−1 denote the shadow price (the Lagrange multiplier of (5.5) in (B.1),
appendix B) of the one-period ahead aggregate-supply relation in period t − 1. That is, Ξt,t−1
measures the increase in value of the intertemporal loss function resulting from an increase in
the one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast in period t − 1, πt,t−1, due, for instance, to a change
in judgment or an anticipated shock. Modify the general targeting rule by adding the term






(πt+τ,t− π∗)2 + λx2
t+τ,t
¤
+ Ξt,t−1(πt+1,t − π∗). (5.10)
This can be interpreted as a commitment to a general targeting rule that involves “continuity
and predictability,” in that the previous cost in period t−1 of adjusting the forecast for period
t + 1 is taken into account. It internalizes the cost of disappointing private-sector expectations
in period t − 1o fi n ﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + 1, by incorporating the cost of the resulting eﬀect on
inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt, had the change in πt+1,t been anticipated in period t−1. It is very much in
line with the transparency, predictability and continuity emphasized in actual inﬂation targeting
(see, for instance, King [50]).43 44
A ss h o w ni nS v e n s s o na n dW o o d f o r d[ 9 6 ] ,t h ec e n t r a lb a n kw i l lt h e ne a c hp e r i o dt choose
the instrument-rate plan it+1,t so as to implicitly achieve the ﬁrst-order condition
πt+1,t − π∗ = −
λ
αx
(xt+1,t − xt,t−1). (5.11)
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sﬁrst-order condition, the one-period-ahead inﬂation-gap forecast shall be pro-
portional to the negative of the change in the current one-period-ahead output-gap forecast from
the previous period, with the proportionality factor λ/αx. As shown in appendix B, equation
(B.9), this is the optimal ﬁrst-order condition, and combining it with the forecasting model (5.5)
and (5.6) will result in the optimal forecasts and instrument plan. Consequently, the implied
instrument decision will fulﬁll (3.5) and be consistent with the optimal reaction function.45
43 An increase dπt+1,t−1 > 0 of the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast in period t − 1 would, everything else
equal, also increase the one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast in period t−1, by dπt,t−1 = δdπt+1,t,b y( 5 . 5 )f o rτ =0
in period t−1( s i n c ee x p e c t a t i o n so fi n ﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt+1aﬀects inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt). The present-value cost
of this in period t − 1i sϕt,t−1δdπt+1,t, the Lagrange multiplier of the same (5.5) for τ =0i np e r i o dt − 1. The
present-value in period t of this is then ϕt,t−1dπt+1,t. Thus, the second term in (5.10) amounts to internalizing in
period t the consequences for the inﬂation forecast for period t of adjusting the inﬂation forecast for period t+1,
had such an adjustment been anticipated in period t − 1.
44 Adding a linear term to the loss function is similar to the linear inﬂation contracts discussed in Walsh [110]
and Persson and Tabellini [72]. Indeed, the term added in (5.10) corresponds to a state-contingent linear inﬂation
contract, which, as discussed in Svensson [86], can remedy both stabilization bias and average-inﬂation bias.
45 The observant reader notes that the modiﬁed loss function making the discretion equilibrium optimal is
related to the idea of recursive contracts by Marcet and Marimon [62].
375.3.4 Advantages and problems of a commitment to a general targeting rule
A commitment to a general targeting rule means specifying clear objectives for monetary policy.
Clear objectives in the form of a well-speciﬁed loss function is often taken for granted in research
on monetary policy. Nevertheless, in practical monetary policy, specifying clear objectives is a
substantial achievement. In practice, discretion in monetary policy has often meant discretion
also with respect to the objectives, as is still the case to some extent for the Federal Reserve
System. Specifying explicit objectives, together with operational independence and eﬀective
accountability structures is rightly considered essential in an eﬀective monetary-policy setup
(see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [7] and Svensson [91]).
A major advantage with a commitment to a general targeting rule is also that the central
bank is free to use all information deemed essential to achieve its objective. In particular, it
allows the central bank to exercise its judgment and extra-model information, as demonstrated
in the backward- and forward-looking models used in the examples above.
What are the problems with a commitment to a general targeting rule? One problem is that
the objectives may still not be suﬃciently well speciﬁed not to be open to interpretation. For
instance, the relative weight on output-gap stabilization in ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, the λ in
(2.2), is not directly speciﬁed by any inﬂation-targeting central bank (as mentioned, I argue in
[92] and [95] that it should be speciﬁed.) In practice, evaluation of inﬂation-targeting monetary
policy is left with examining reported forecasts of the inﬂation and output gaps and assessing
whether they “look good” and provide a reasonable compromise between keeping inﬂation close
to target and the output-gap movements necessary for this (as was the case for me in Svensson
[91]).
A second potential problem, emphasized by Woodford [113], is the potential consequences of
the discretionary optimization under a commitment to a general targeting rule, more precisely
that such discretionary optimization is not fully optimal in a situation with forward-looking
variables. As we have seen, discretionary optimization results in stabilization bias and a lack
of history dependence.46 The practical and empirical importance of the ineﬃciency caused by
discretionary optimization is not obvious, though. It is perfectly possible that, in realistic models
with considerable inertia and strong backward-looking elements, this ineﬃciency is overwhelmed
by beneﬁts from both specifying clear objectives for monetary policy and allowing all relevant
46 The remedies Woodford [113] suggests are actually commitments to alternative speciﬁc targeting rules–
although they are not called so.
38information and judgment to bear on monetary-policy decisions. Simulations by McCallum and
Nelson [67] and Vestin [109] do not reject the hypotheses that the ineﬃciency is relatively small.
Furthermore, the discretion involved in a commitment to a general targeting rule may be
constrained by a few more sophisticated mechanisms. The emphasis in inﬂation targeting on
predictability and transparency may be interpreted as a commitment to not surprising the private
sector, eﬀectively similar to the “commitment to continuity and predictability” introduced above
which enforces the commitment equilibrium. As discussed in Faust and Svensson [29], increased
transparency may increase the reputational costs of deviating from announced goals and this
way enforce a policy closer to the optimal commitment.47
Remaining problems with a commitment to a general targeting rule can potentially be solved
by a commitment to a speciﬁc targeting rule, though.
5.4 A commitment to a speciﬁc forecast-targeting rule
A speciﬁc targeting rule speciﬁes a condition for the forecasts of the target variables, which can
formally be written as
G(πt,x t)=0 , (5.12)
where G(·,·) is a vector-valued function (possibly). This condition may be an optimal ﬁrst-order
condition, or an approximate ﬁrst-order condition. Indeed, the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule ex-
presses the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution
between the forecasts of the target variables in an operational way. Then, the monetary-policy
problem consists of ﬁnding the combination of forecasts and instrument path, (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt), that is
consistent with the central bank’s forecasting model and fulﬁlls the speciﬁc targeting rule, (5.12).
Thus, in contrast to a commitment to a general targeting rule, once the condition (5.12) has
been speciﬁed, ﬁnding the optimal forecasts and instrument plan is not a matter of minimizing
a loss function but ﬁnding the solution to a system of diﬀerence equations.48
5.4.1 The backward-looking model
In the backward-looking model, the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule for the forecasts πt and xt
in period t is the ﬁrst order condition for an optimum, (5.4) for τ ≥ 1, derived in appendix A,
47 Indeed, both these mechanisms arguably provide some foundations for McCallum’s [64] loosely speciﬁed idea
of “just do it.”
48 Alternatively, we can say that the central bank has a new (intermediate) intertemporal loss function to





t), the minimum of which occurs for (5.12).
Thus, to each speciﬁc targeting rule, we can assign a trivial general targeting rule.
39equation (B.5). When the discount factor is close to unity, δ ≈ 1, the speciﬁc targeting rule can
be written approximately as
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =
λ
αx
(xt+τ+1,t − xt+τ,t). (5.13)
That is, the inﬂation-gap forecast should be proportional, with the factor λ/αx, to the forecast
of the change in the output gap.
This speciﬁc targeting rule follows directly from the equality of the marginal rate transfor-
mation of the output gap into inﬂation (following from the aggregate-supply relation, (5.2)) and
the marginal rate of substitution of inﬂation for the output gap (following from the intertem-
poral loss function, (5.1)). More precisely, in order to specify the relevant marginal rate of
transformation from the output gap into inﬂation, consider the output-gap changes necessary
for an increase in the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast, dπt+2,t > 0, while holding the inﬂation
forecast at all other horizons constant, dπt+j,t =0 ,j 6= 2. From the aggregate-supply relation,
(5.2), for τ = 1, we realize that the one-period-ahead output-gap forecast has to be increased,
dxt+1,t > 0, resulting in an increase of the two-period-ahead forecast, fulﬁlling
dπt+2,t = αxdxt+1,t > 0. (5.14)
Furthermore, in order to keep the three-period-ahead inﬂation forecast unchanged, dπt+3,t =0 ,
we realize from (5.2) for τ = 2, that the two-period-ahead output-gap forecast must be reduced,
dxt+2,t = −dπt+2,t/αx = −dxt+1,t < 0,
where I have used (5.14). Thus, we need a combination of an increase in the one-period-ahead
and reduction in the two-period-ahead output-gap forecasts to get a change in the two-period-
ahead inﬂation forecast only. It is practical to have a compact notation for such combinations,
so I let them be denoted by the vector
˜ xt+1,t ≡ (xt+1,t,x t+2,t) ≡ (1,−1)xt+1,t. (5.15)
Now, let MRT(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t) denote the marginal rate of transformation of the combination
of output-gap forecasts ˜ xt+1,t into the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast, πt+2,t. By (5.14), it
obviously fulﬁlls
MRT(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t) ≡
dπt+2,t
dxt+1,t
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dxt+2,t=−dxt+1,t
= αx. (5.16)
40Thus we have found the relevant marginal rate of transformation. It is a generalization of the
standard marginal rate of transformation since it involves the transformation of a combination
of variables, rather than a single variable, into another variable.
It remains to ﬁnd the corresponding marginal rate of substitution.L e t M R S ( πt+j,t,x t+k,t)
denote the (standard) marginal rate of substitution of inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + j, πt+j,t,f o rt h e










Let MRS(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t) denote the (generalized) marginal rate of substitution of πt+2,t for the
combination of output-gap forecasts ˜ xt+1,t. It will be given by the sum of the marginal rates
of substitution of πt+2,t for the separate changes in the output-gap forecasts (an increase one
period ahead, an equal decrease two periods ahead), hence
MRS(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t) ≡
dπt+2,t
dxt+1,t
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dLt=0,d x t+2,t=−dxt+1,t
=M R S ( πt+2,t,x t+1,t)+M R S ( πt+2,t,x t+2,t)(−1).





Thus, we have found the relevant marginal rates of transformation and substitution between
the target variables. Equalizing these,
MRT(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t)=M R S ( πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t),
gives (5.4) for τ = 1. Repeating the argument above for πt+3,t, etc., results in (5.4) for τ ≥ 1.
Once the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule has been speciﬁed, the decision-making process of the
central bank each period t is then to ﬁnd inﬂation- and output-gap forecasts that are consistent
with the speciﬁc targeting rule. This means combining (5.4) (or its approximation (5.13)) with
the forecasting model, (5.2) and (5.3) for the judgment zt,a n dﬁnding the appropriate inﬂation-
and output-gap forecasts and the corresponding instrument path. In particular, this can be
done in a two-step procedure. First, the speciﬁc targeting rule is combined with the Phillips
curve, (5.2), and the optimal inﬂation- and output-gap forecasts, (ˆ πt, ˆ xt), are determined. Then
these forecasts are used in the aggregate-demand relation, (5.3), to infer the corresponding
instrument path, ˆ ıt. Again, the optimal instrument setting in period t is then given by it =ˆ ıt,t.
41This instrument setting will be consistent with the optimal reaction function, (3.1), but this
reaction function need not be made explicit. Indeed, given (5.3) for τ = 0, the judgment zt and
the optimal forecasts ˆ πt and ˆ xt, the optimal instrument-rate setting in period t is given by










The speciﬁc targeting rule can be formulated, using the approximation (5.13), as: “Select the
instrument path so that the marginal rate of transformation of the output gap into inﬂation and
the marginal rate of substitution of inﬂation for the output gap are equal, more speciﬁcally, that
the inﬂation-gap forecast equals the proportion λ/αx of the change in the output-gap forecast.”
The central bank then need not optimize but just solve diﬀerence equations.
We note that the targeting rule (5.4) only depends on the parameters δ (the discount factor),
λ (the relative weight on output-gap stabilization) and αx (the eﬀect of the output gap on inﬂa-
tion, the slope of the short-run Phillips curve). In particular, the targeting rule is independent
of the coeﬃcients in the vectors αz and βz. That is, it is independent of how the deviation
aﬀects inﬂation and output, and hence also of the judgment, the forecast of the deviations. Fur-
thermore, the targeting rule (5.4) is independent of all the parameters of the aggregate-demand
relation, (5.3). Indeed, the targeting rule only depends on the loss function, (5.1), via the
marginal rate of substitution between inﬂation and the output gap (hence on the parameters
δ and λ), and the aggregate-supply relation, the Phillips curve (5.2), via the marginal rate of
transformation between inﬂation and the output gap (hence on the parameter αx). Since the
marginal rates of transformation only depend on the derivatives of the aggregate-supply relation
with respect to inﬂation and the output gap, the additive judgement (the “add factors”) do
not appear in the optimal targeting rule. This illustrates the relative robustness of targeting
rules (relative to optimal reaction functions and instrument rules) suggested in Svensson [85]
and further examined and conﬁrmed in Svensson and Woodford [96].49
49 For the case of strict inﬂation targeting, λ =0 ,t h es p e c i ﬁc targeting rule (5.4) simpliﬁes to the trivial
πt+2,t = π
∗.
That is, the two-period-ahead inﬂation should equal the inﬂation target. From (5.2) for τ = 1, it follows that the
optimal one-period-ahead output-gap forecast, ˆ xt+1,t,m u s tf u l ﬁll





Using this in (5.18) will result in the desired instrument setting, ˆ ıt,t, which will be consistent with the reaction
function (3.4). Again, this reaction function need never be made explicit.
42As i m p l es p e c i ﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e As noted above and in footnote 5, the Bank of England
and Sveriges Riksbank have formulated a simple speciﬁc targeting rule, “set the instrument
rate so that a constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast about two-years ahead equals the inﬂation
target.” This can be seen as an attempt to formulate an operational and simple targeting rule,
not necessarily optimal but hopefully not far from being optimal. If the two-year horizon is seen
as longer than the minimum horizon at which inﬂation can be aﬀected, it can be interpreted as
corresponding to ﬂexible rather than strict inﬂation targeting. Since it takes a minimum of two
periods to aﬀect inﬂation in the simple model, and since I have assumed above that the period
is 3 quarters, let me interpret the approximate two-year horizon as three periods (9 quarters).
Thus, this simple rule can be interpreted as
πt+3,t = π∗, (5.19)
where the 3-period-ahead inﬂation forecast, πt+3,t, is taken to be conditional on a constant
interest rate, in this case corresponding to it+1,t = it,t = it. The implied reaction function
resulting from this simple targeting rule is derived in appendix A.1, equation (A.17).
Clearly, the simple targeting rule (5.19) is generally diﬀerent from the optimal speciﬁct a r -
geting rule (5.4) or (5.13). Consequently, the implied reaction function derived in appendix A.1
is diﬀerent from the optimal reaction function (3.1), corresponding to this simple targeting rule
not being optimal. In addition to not being optimal, there are a number of additional problems
with using constant-interest-rate forecasts, as discussed in Kohn [52].
A special case: Aggregate supply independent of judgment Consider the unrealistic
special case when the aggregate-supply relation, (2.4) and (5.2), is independent of judgment,
αz ≡ 0, so judgment only aﬀects the aggregate-demand relation, βz 6= 0. Combination of the
optimal targeting rule (5.4) with the aggregate-supply relation (5.2) then results in a diﬀerence
equation for the inﬂation forecast that fulﬁlls (see (A.8) in appendix A)
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ = cτ(πt+1,t − π∗)( 5 . 2 0 )
for τ ≥ 1. Here the coeﬃcient c = c(λ), 0 ≤ c(λ) < 1, is an increasing function of the relative
weight λ on output-gap stabilization, as reported in section 3.1 and derived in appendix A.
This speciﬁc targeting rule has been emphasized in Svensson [85] and [88]. It shows that, under
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (λ>0a n d0<c (λ) < 1), the inﬂation forecast should be brought
back to the inﬂation target gradually and exponentially (if the predetermined one-period-ahead
43inﬂation forecast, πt+1,t, deviates from the inﬂation target). Furthermore, the higher the relative
weight on output-gap stabilization, the larger the coeﬃcient c(λ), and the slower the approach
towards the inﬂation target.
But this simple and intuitive speciﬁc targeting rule for the backward-looking model is only
valid under the special and unrealistic assumption of aggregate supply independent of judgment.
(Therefore, in retrospect, I wish that I had not emphasized this particular targeting rule, (5.20),
that much, for instance, in [85] and [88].) Without that assumption, the judgment enters in a
complicated way in (5.20), as seen in (A.8). Thus, the still simple (5.4) is the more general form
of the speciﬁc targeting rule for the backward-looking model, valid also when judgment aﬀects
the aggregate-supply relation.
5.4.2 The forward-looking model
For the forward-looking model, appendix B, equation (B.5), and Svensson and Woodford [96]
show that the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule is
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ = −
λ
αx
(xt+τ+1,t − xt+τ,t)( 5 . 2 1 )
for τ ≥ 0. For τ = 0, as discussed brieﬂy in appendix B, equation (B.10), and in detail in [96],
xt,t is interpreted as given by
xt,t ≡ xt,t−1, (5.22)
the one-period-ahead output-gap forecast in the previous period, xt,t−1 (and not the current
output gap, xt), in order to be optimal in a timeless perspective.
Again, this speciﬁc targeting rule can be derived directly from the equality of the marginal
rate transformation of the output gap into inﬂation (following from the aggregate-supply relation,
(5.5)) and the marginal rate of substitution of inﬂation for the output gap (following from the
intertemporal loss function, (5.1)). Again, because the marginal rate of transformation depends
on the derivatives of the aggregate-supply relation with respect to inﬂation and the output gap,
the judgment part and the aggregate-demand relation do not appear.
The relevant marginal rates of transformation and substitution can thus be found with a
similar argument as above for the backward-looking model in section 5.4.1. Consider the se-
quence of output-gap forecast changes required to increase the two-period-ahead inﬂation fore-
cast, dπt+2,t > 0, while holding the inﬂation forecast at other horizons constant, dπt+j,t =0 ,
j 6= 2. From (5.5) for τ = 0, we see that any increase in the two-period-ahead inﬂation
44forecast, dπt+2,t > 0, everything else equal, will increase the one-period-ahead inﬂation fore-
cast, πt+1,t, since one-period-ahead inﬂation depends on expectations of two-period-ahead inﬂa-
tion. Keeping πt+1,t constant then requires a fall in the one-period-ahead output gap forecast,




dxt+1,t > 0. (5.23)
Furthermore, from (5.5) for τ = 1, we see that constancy of πt+3,t then requires an increase
in the two-period-ahead output-gap forecast, dxt+2,t = −dπt+2,t/αx = −dxt+1,t/δ.T h u s ,t h e
relevant combination, ˜ xt+1,t, of one- and two-period-ahead output-gap forecasts is ˜ xt+1,t ≡
(xt+1,t,x t+2,t) ≡ (1,−1/δ)xt+1,t. By (5.23), it follows that the relevant marginal rate of trans-
formation of this combination ˜ xt+1,t into πt+2,t is given by
MRT(πt+2,t, ˜ xt+1,t) ≡
dπt+2,t
dxt+1,t






By a similar argument as for the backward-looking model in section 5.4.1, the relevant
marginal rate of substitution of πt+2,t for this combination ˜ xt+1,t will be















with the use of (5.17). Equality of the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate
of substitution then results in (5.21) for τ = 1. Repeating the same argument for πt+3,t,e t c . ,
results in (5.21) for τ ≥ 1. Repeating the same argument for πt+1,t, taking into account the
hypothetical eﬀect on πt,t−1 if this had been anticipated (that is, considering optimality in the
time-less perspective), results in (5.21) for τ = 0 with (5.22).
Thus, the central bank should ﬁnd the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts that fulﬁll the
speciﬁc targeting rule (5.21) with (5.22). This is done by combining the speciﬁc targeting rule
with the forward-looking Phillips curve, (5.5), which results in the optimal forecasts, ˆ πt and ˆ xt.
From the aggregate-demand relation, (5.6), for τ = 0, the optimal instrument decision is given
by
ˆ ıt+1,t = r∗
t+1,t + π∗ +(ˆ πt+2,t − π∗)+
1
βr




The resulting instrument decision will be consistent with the optimal reaction function, (3.5).
Again, the optimal reaction function need never be made explicit.
45We note that the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule for the forward-looking model, (5.21) with
(5.22), is diﬀerent from the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule for the backward-looking model,
(5.4). Comparing (5.21) to the approximation (5.13) for δ ≈ 1, we see that the right side is
the same but have opposite signs. This is because the marginal rate of transformation between
inﬂation and the output gap, the dynamic tradeoﬀ between the target variables, is diﬀerent for
the two aggregate-supply relations, cf. (5.16) and (5.24). As has been observed in the literature,
the dynamics of the backward-looking and the forward-looking Phillips curves (5.2) and (5.5)
are quite diﬀerent. A steady increase in inﬂation corresponds to a positive output gap in the
backward-looking Phillips curve but a negative output gap in the forward-looking one (see Ball
[1] and Mankiw [61]).
The simple speciﬁc targeting rule like (5.19) raises additional issues and problems in a
forward-looking model, as discussed in appendix B.2 and by Leitemo [56].
A commitment to a speciﬁc price-level targeting rule Consider a commitment to an
alternative speciﬁc targeting rule, related to price-level targeting. First, let pt denote (the log











t,t + π∗τ. (5.26)
This price-level target path starts from p∗
t,t and then increases at a rate equal to the inﬂation
target. Since the starting point depends on the current price level which is subject to random







for τ ≥ 0. That is, the price-level-gap forecast should be proportional to the negative of the
output-gap forecast. By ﬁrst-diﬀerenting (5.27), we see that this speciﬁc targeting rule is equiv-
alent to the optimal targeting rule (5.21) with (5.22). This illustrates the close relation between
optimal inﬂation targeting under commitment and price-level targeting under discretion previ-
ously discussed by Svensson [89], Vestin [108], Svensson and Woodford [96] and Smets [82].
465.4.3 Advantages and problems of a commitment to a speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e
A commitment to a speciﬁc targeting rule has the obvious advantage of providing a more spe-
ciﬁc, more operational, and more easily veriﬁable commitment than a commitment to a general
targeting rule. This way it provides stronger accountability. The optimal speciﬁc targeting
rule can also overcome any ineﬃciency caused by discretionary optimization, while retaining
the ﬂexibility in allowing all relevant information and judgment to bear on the monetary-policy
decision. Compared to the benchmark of a commitment to the optimal instrument rule, it is
more robust, in the sense of only depending on part of the model of the transmission mechanism,
namely the marginal rate of transformation between the target variables.
A potential disadvantage, however, is that a speciﬁc targeting rule, in order to be optimal,
depends on the precise marginal rate of transformation, the dynamic tradeoﬀ between the target
variables. Therefore, it is not robust to diﬀerent models of the aggregate-supply relation, as is
apparent in the examples of the backward-looking and forward-looking models used above. Thus,
it is clearly less robust than a commitment to a general targeting rule.
The simple speciﬁc targeting rule of the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank discussed
above is at most a rather preliminary attempt to formulate an operational speciﬁc targeting rule
and raises a number of problems, as discussed in Kohn [52] and Leitemo [56].
5.5 Some criticism
McCallum, for instance in [66], and McCallum and Nelson, for instance in [67], have several
times criticized various aspects of and defended alternatives to ideas presented in this paper.
First, as a defense of instrument rules involving responses to target variables only, they have
suggested that there is a beneﬁt to discussing monetary policy without reference to explicit loss
functions. At the same time, the results of these instrument rules have been evaluated in terms
of the resulting variances of inﬂation and the output gap. But this is equivalent to using a loss
function consisting of a weighted sum of the variances of inﬂation and the output gap, (2.3), for
diﬀerent values of the weight λ. It seems more transparent to me, then, to be explicit about
47such a loss function.50 51
Second, McCallum and Nelson have also argued that targeting rules can be replaced by
obvious instrument rules, thereby implying that targeting rules are redundant. Consider, for
instance, the targeting rule (5.21) with (5.22) with τ = 0 for the forward-looking model above,
which can be written
πt+1,t − π∗ +
λ
αx
(xt+1,t − xt,t−1)=0 . (5.28)
The idea is that this can be replaced by an instrument rule of, for instance, the form
it =( 1− fi)
½
¯ r + πt + γ
·






where the response coeﬃcient, γ, is very large (McCallum and Nelson [67] in simulations suggest
γ ≥ 50) and in the limit approaches inﬁnity. Such an instrument rule would ensure that the
term within the square brackets is arbitrarily close to zero and hence fulﬁlls the targeting rule
(5.28). However, as discussed in detail in Svensson and Woodford [96], this is a dangerous
and completely impracticable idea. It is completely inconceivable in practical monetary policy
to have reaction functions with very large response coeﬃcients, since the slightest mistake in
calculating the argument of the reaction function would have grave consequences and result in
extreme instrument-rate volatility. (Such interest-rate volatility does not arise in McCallum and
Nelson’s [67] simulations because no mistakes are allowed for.) The fact that McCallum has long
argued for robust instrument rules makes this idea even more surprising.52
Third, McCallum and Nelson have also argued that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand pro-
vides an example of a central bank that is committed to an instrument rule, as an argument in
favor the practical relevance of instrument rules. It is true that the Reserve Bank uses a reaction
function of the form (4.6) in its Forecasting and Policy System (FPS) in order to generate an
endogenous future interest-rate path. However, for the ﬁrst few quarters of this interest-rate
50 A common way of evaluating the outcome of alternative instrument rules is to plot the result in a graph
with unconditional inﬂation variance on the horisontal axis and unconditional output-gap variance on the vertical
axis and then examine the result in relation to the “Taylor curve” (see Taylor [99]) of eﬃcient combinations of
the two variances. This is of course equivalent to using a loss function of the form (2.3), with diﬀerent relative
weights λ ≥ 0. Indeed, a common way to ﬁnd the Taylor curve is to optimize over a class of reaction functions
for values of λ from zero to inﬁn i t y .S e e ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,R u d e b u s c ha n dS v e n s s o n[ 7 8 ]a n ds e v e r a lo t h e rp a p e r si n
Taylor [103].
Taylor [99] plotted the standard deviations along the axes; plotting the variances has the advantage that the
(negative) slope at a preferred point on the Taylor curve can be interpreted as revealing 1/λ in the loss function
above, since indiﬀerence curves for the loss function (2.3) correspond to straigth lines with (negative) slope 1/λ.
51 Another problem with restricting simple rules to respond to target variables only is, as noted above, that the
general principle is that it is best to respond to the main determinants of the (forecasts) of the target variables.
The set of these main determinants is likely to include more variables than the current target variables; indeed,
the current target variables may not bea m o n gt h ed e t e r m i n a n t sa ta l l( w h i c hi st h ec a s ew h e nt h et a r g e tv a r i a b l e s
are forward-looking variables).
52 Furthermore, on a more technical note and as examined in Svensson and Woodford [96], stability properties
of the model are not invariant between (5.28) and (5.29).
48path, the interest rate is set by discretion and judgment, and the reaction function is only used
further into the future. Hence, it is not the case that the current interest-rate decision, or even
the ﬁrst few quarters of the interest-rate path, is given by the reaction function. Brash [13]
and Svensson [91] provide some further details on the decision-making process of the Reserve
Bank.53
5.6 Interest-rate stabilization and smoothing and exchange-rate smoothing
The discussion of instrument rules and targeting rules here has, except brieﬂy in the discussion
of the forecast-based instrument rule (4.6) in section 4.4, been under the assumption of no
separate monetary-policy objectives of interest-rate stabilization and/or smoothing. That is,
only inﬂation and the output gap has been considered target variables and hence entered the
loss function, and only (forecasts of) inﬂation and the output gap have entered the speciﬁc
targeting rules discussed.
I ﬁnd the case for explicit instrument-rate stabilization and/or smoothing objectives quite
weak (see Sack and Wieland [79] for further discussion and empirical evidence). Such objectives
would correspond to adding the term λi(it −¯ ı)2 +λ∆i(it −it−1)2,w h e r eλi and λ∆i are positive
weights and ¯ ı denotes the average instrument-rate level, in the period loss function (2.2). Possible
adverse consequences for ﬁnancial markets of interest-rate volatility, beyond the real eﬀects
represented by output-gap stabilization, are hardly convincing, except in special circumstances
with an exceptionally weak ﬁnancial sector. A desire to avoid too large interest-rate surprises
would rather correspond to a term of the form λi(it − it|t−1)2,w h e r eit|t−1 denotes previous
market expectations of the instrument rate, but with a systematic and transparent monetary
policy as in current inﬂation targeting, instrument-rate surprises are small anyhow. In practical
monetary policy, there are recent conspicuous deviations from instrument-rate smoothing, in
Fed interest-rate reductions in the ﬁrst half of 2001 and previously Willem Buiter’s voting in
the Bank of England MPC. Deviations from Friedman’s [34] optimal quantity of money could
motivate a quadratic interest-rate term (cf. Woodford [114]), but since most money pays some
interest these days, the distortion would seem to be minor, and it is diﬃcult to see that such
costs could be signiﬁcant compared to the costs of variability of inﬂation and the output gap.
Woodford [115] has shown that an instrument-smoothing objective under discretion can induce
53 In my review of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand, [91], I actually criticize the Reserve Bank
for its use of this form of a reaction function and suggest that it considers alternatives, with reference to the same
problems as those repo r t e di ns e c t i o n4 . 4 .
49a desirable history-dependence of monetary policy. In the perspective of this paper, though, a
commitment to an optimal speciﬁc targeting rule is a more direct way of achieving such history-
dependence. The practical importance of history-dependence also remains to be established, as
noted above. Rudebusch [76] suggests that the high coeﬃcient on the lagged federal funds rate
in estimated Fed reaction functions can be explained by the Fed reacting to persistent shocks
rather than to some separate interest-rate smoothing objective.54
If interest-rate stabilization and/or smoothing nevertheless is a separate monetary policy
objective, the interest rate in question is also a target variable. Most of the above-mentioned
reason for such objectives would probably apply to something like a 3-month money-market
interest rate, rather than the instrument rate (which is typically a repo rate or an overnight
rate). Then this market interest rate becomes an additional target variable, separate from, but
related to (via the expectations hypothesis, for instance) the instrument rate.
The more target variables, the more complex the speciﬁc targeting rules. In particular, if
an interest rate is a target variable, the targeting rules not only depend on the loss function
and the Phillips curve, but also on the aggregate-demand relation, since the latter involves the
tradeoﬀs between output and interest rates. It would still be the case that additive judgement,
as in the backward- and forward-looking example models used here, would not enter explicitly
in the targeting rules. In this respect, the optimal targeting rule would still be simpler than the
optimal instrument rule, since the judgment would enter the latter, in addition in a complex
way, as we have seen in the above example models. In case the instrument rate enters the loss
function, so the instrument rate rather than a somewhat longer market rate is a target variable,
the targeting rule would be indistinguishable from an implicit forecast-based instrument rule
(although, for a reasonable loss function, of diﬀerent form than (4.6)).
As an example, consider the case of instrument-rate stabilization, when the term λi(it+τ,t−¯ ı)2
is added within the bracket in the intertemporal loss function (5.1), corresponding to a separate
objective to stabilize the instrument rate around its mean, ¯ ı. Then the instrument rate is also
a target variable. For the backward-looking model, in section 5.4.1 above I speciﬁed the required
changes (dxt+1,t,dx t+2,t)=( 1 ,−1)dxt+1,t in the output-gap forecast for a change in the two-
period-ahead inﬂation forecast only. By the aggregate-demand relation, (5.3), for τ =0a n d
54 Even though the PTA for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand states that the Reserve Bank “shall seek to avoid
unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate,” I must confess that I, in my evaluation
[91], did not much consider stability of interest rates as a separate objective.






















Thus, the relevant linear combination of target variables now includes these instrument rates and
is given by ˜ xt+1,t ≡ (xt+1,t,x t+2,t,i t,t,i t+1,t,i t+2,t) ≡ [1,−1,−1/βr,(αxβr+1+βx)/βr,−βx/βr]xt+1,t.
With this interpretation of ˜ xt+1,t, the relevant marginal rate of transformation of ˜ xt+1,t into πt+2,t
is still given by (5.16). The calculation of the relevant marginal rate of substitution of πt+2,t for
this combination ˜ xt+1,t must now take into account the required changes in the instrument rate










λi[(it,t −¯ ı) − δ(αxβr +1+βx)(it+1,t −¯ ı)+δ2βx(it+2,t −¯ ı)]
δ2βr(πt+2,t − π∗)
. (5.30)
Equality of the marginal rate of transformation (5.16) and substitution (5.30), and repeating
the argument for πt+3,t, etc., then implies the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule







[δ2βx(it+τ+1,t −¯ ı) − δ(αxβr +1+βx)(it+τ,t−¯ ı)+( it+τ−1,t −¯ ı)]
(5.31)
for τ ≥ 1. The decision problem then consists of combining (5.31) with both the aggregate-
supply and aggregate-demand relations, (5.2) and (5.3), and solving for the optimal combination
of inﬂation, output-gap and instrument-rate forecasts, (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt) ,a n dt h e ni m p l e m e n t i n gˆ ıt,t.
For the forward-looking model, similar reasoning results in the relevant linear combination of
target variables ˜ xt+1,t ≡ (xt+1,t,x t+2,t,i t,t,i t+1,t,i t+2,t) ≡ [1,−1/δ,1/βr,−(αxβr +1+δ)/δβr,
1/δβr]xt+1,t and the optimal speciﬁc targeting rule







[(αxβr)(it+τ,t−¯ ı) − δ(it+τ+1,t − it+τ,t)+( it+τ,t− it+τ−1,t)] (5.32)
51for τ ≥ 0, with (5.22) and it,t ≡ it,t−1, it−1,t ≡ it−1,t−2. The decision problem then consists
of combining (5.32) with both the aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand relations, (5.5) and
(5.6), and solving for the optimal combination of inﬂation, output-gap and instrument-rate
forecasts, (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt) ,a n dt h e ni m p l e m e n t i n gˆ ıt+1,t.55
Are (5.31) and (5.32) targeting rules or instrument rules? Since the instrument rate appears,
they are also “implicit” instrument rules. They are not “explicit” instrument rules, since the
relations do not express the instrument as function of predetermined variables only, but as an
equilibrium condition for endogenous variables. However, (5.31) and (5.32) are fundamentally
targeting rules, in the sense that only variables who are target variables enter there. The
instrument rate being a separate target variable is a necessary condition for it to appear in
these rules. If we set λi = 0, so the instrument rate no longer is a separate target variable, the
instrument rate no longer appears in the speciﬁc targeting rule.
One can conceive of a separate objective of exchange-rate smoothing, meaning the addition
to the period loss function of a term λ∆s(st − st−1)2,w h e r eλ∆s is a positive weight and st is
the log of the nominal exchange rate, so st − st−1 is the rate of currency depreciation (when
the exchange rate is measured as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). It is
certainly possible for central banks to smooth exchange rates somewhat, at the cost of increased
variability in the other target variables, inﬂation and the output gap. One can also conceive of
separate objectives of real-exchange-rate smoothing, or even stabilization of a real-exchange-rate
gap between the real exchange rate and a “potential” real exchange rate. Additional separate
objectives makes monetary policy more ambitious and the corresponding decision problem, and
the corresponding speciﬁc targeting rule more complex, in a similar way as interest-rate stabi-
lization causes more complexity. It therefore makes commitment and veriﬁcation more diﬃcult.
I see no good reasons for separate exchange-rate objectives, nominal or real, under ﬂexible inﬂa-
tion targeting in advanced countries.56 A sd i s c u s s e di ns o m ed e t a i li nS v e n s s o n[ 9 0 ] ,i na no p e n
economy with CPI inﬂation targeting, there may nevertheless be some implicit real-exchange-
rate smoothing, depending on the share of imported ﬁnal goods and the degree of exchange-rate
pass-through.57
55 Note that (5.32) is the same optimal ﬁrst-order condition as equation (32) in Giannoni [36]. Giannoni assumes
a loss function with interest-rate stabilization (λi > 0) and uses the forward-looking model with current inﬂation
and output being forward-looking variables rather than predetermined. Giovanni and Woodford [38] have recently
provided a detailed discussion of targeting rules when the instrument rate is one of the target variables.
56 In emerging market economies, foreign currency debt, vulnerable balance sheets and related threats to
ﬁnancial stability may arguably motivate some separate weight on exchange-rate smoothing.
57 For simplicity, assume a unitary immediate exchange-rate pass-through to the CPI of a small open economy.
Its CPI inﬂation, π
c
t,c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na sπ
c
t = πt+ω(qt−qt−1), where πt is inﬂa t i o ni nd o m e s t i c a l l yp r o d u c e d
525.7 Distribution forecast targeting
Under the above assumptions of a quadratic loss function and an essentially linear transmission
mechanism, together with additive uncertainty, the certainty-equivalence result implies that
the mean forecasts are the relevant target variables, regardless of the degree of uncertainty.
When the uncertainty about the transmission mechanism is “nonadditive,” that is, there is
uncertainty about the policy multipliers, or if the transmission mechanism is characterized by
signiﬁcant nonlinearities, certainty-equivalence no longer applies, and the mean forecasts of
the target variables are not suﬃcient. Instead, the “balance of risks” and indeed the whole
probability distribution of the target variables matter. As discussed in Svensson [93] and [87],
forecast targeting can then be generalized from mean forecast targeting to distribution forecast
targeting.
Distribution forecast targeting would then consist of constructing conditional probability dis-
tributions of the target variables instead of mean forecast only. Thus, for a given instrument-rate
path, the central bank would construct the joint conditional density function of the random path
of inﬂation and the output gap, conditional upon all information available in period t, the judg-
ment, and a given instrument-rate path. Then, the intertemporal loss function is evaluated with
the help of this conditional probability distribution. First, this can be done informally, by the
decision-making body of the bank. In this case, the decision-making body could be presented
with the probability distributions of the target variables for a few alternative instrument-rate
paths and then decide which path and distribution provides the best compromise. This is,
in principle, the same problem that any economic agent is assumed to solve in countless ap-
plications of decision-making under uncertainty. Second, given a numerical representation of
the probability distributions and a speciﬁcation of the parameters of the loss function, the loss
function can easily be evaluated numerically.
Inﬂation-targeting central banks already seem to consider the whole probability distribution
of the forecast, by considering the “balance of risks.” Furthermore, the Bank of England and
the Riksbank have developed sophisticated methods for constructing conﬁdence intervals for
the forecasts published in their Inﬂation Reports (see Blix and Sellin [12] and Britton, Fisher
and Whitley [14]). The Bank of England presents fan charts for both inﬂation and output,
goods and services in the CPI, ω is the share of imported goods in the CPI, and qt is the log real exchange








2(qt −qt−1)+2ωπt(qt −qt−1), so the square of real currency depreciation implicitly enters the loss
function.
53and the Riksbank gives conﬁdence intervals for its inﬂation forecasts. Furthermore, scrutiny of
the motivations for instrument-rate changes (including the minutes from the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee and the Riksbank’s Executive Board) indicate that both banks
occasionally take properties of the whole distribution into account in their decisions, for instance,
when the risk is unbalanced and “downside risk” diﬀer from “upside risk.”
However, the point forecasts (the center of the conﬁdence intervals) reported and published
by the Bank of England and the Riksbank are, by tradition, mode forecasts (that is, the most
likely outcome), rather than mean forecasts. When the probability distribution is asymmetric,
these two diﬀer. Hence, one interpretation of the adjustment of the mode because of the balance
of risk, is that it is just a way of constructing the mean, in which case the procedure is still one
of mean forecast targeting rather than true distribution forecast targeting. It would be more
transparent to always let the reported point forecasts be the mean forecasts rather than the
mode forecasts, and then explicitly report whether the balance-of-risk considerations imply that
the banks are deviating from mean forecast targeting.
6 Summary and conclusions
This paper starts from the observation that most recent research on monetary-policy rules is
restricted to consider a commitment to a simple instrument rule, where the central-bank in-
strument is a simple function of available information about the economy, like the Taylor rule.
Alternatively, as proposed by Taylor, for instance, in [100] and [105], the proposed simple instru-
ment rules are only to be used as “guidelines” and that deviations from the rules are sometimes
called for. The paper argues that a commitment to a simple instrument rule is inadequate as
a description of current monetary policy, especially inﬂation targeting. Furthermore, it argues
that the proposal to use simple instrument rules as mere guidelines is incomplete and too vague
to be operational. First, monetary-policy reform in the last two decades is better described as
the formulation of clear objectives for monetary policy and the creation of institutional com-
mitment to those objectives. Second, inﬂation-targeting central banks have developed elaborate
decision-making processes, in which huge amounts of data are collected and processed, con-
ditional inﬂation- and output-gap forecasts are constructed with the exercise of considerable
judgment and extra-model information, and an instrument decision is reached with the help
of those forecasts. This process can to a large extent be seen as inﬂation-forecast targeting,
setting the instrument so that the corresponding conditional inﬂation forecast, conditional on
54all relevant information and judgment, is consistent with the inﬂation target and the output-gap
forecast not indicating too much output-gap variability. Third, no central bank has made an
explicit commitment to a simple instrument rule. Instead, some prominent current and former
central bankers seem highly skeptical about the idea. Neither has any central bank announced
that a particular simple instrument rule is used as a guideline. Fourth, the proposal to use
instrument rules as guidelines is incomplete and too vague to be operational, since it does not
provide any rules for when deviations from the rule are appropriate.
The paper attempts to bridge the gap between the recent literature’s focus on simple in-
strument rules and the actual monetary-policy practice by inﬂation-targeting central banks. It
argues that, in order to be more useful, the concept of monetary-policy rules should be broad-
ened beyond the narrow instrument rules and also include targeting rules. It argues that, both
from a descriptive and a prescriptive perspective, inﬂation targeting is better understood as a
commitment to a targeting rule,e i t h e rageneral targeting rule in the form of clear objectives
for monetary policy or a speciﬁc targeting rule in the form of a condition for (the forecasts of)
the target variables. The optimal speciﬁc targeting rule is actually an operational speciﬁcation
of the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution
between the target variables. Targeting rules have the important advantage that they allow
the use of judgment and extra-model information. They are also more robust and easier to
verify than optimal instrument rules, but they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the
socially optimal equilibrium. These ideas are illustrated with the help of two simple examples
of the transmission mechanism. Some recent defense of commitment to simple instrument rules
and criticism of forward-looking monetary policy and targeting rules by McCallum, Nelson and
Woodford are also addressed.
Whereas simple instrument rules, like variants of the Taylor rule, may to some extent serve as
very rough benchmarks for good monetary policy, they are very incomplete rules, because they
don’t specify when the central bank should or should not deviate from the simple instrument rule.
Such deviations, by discretion and judgment, have been and will be frequent, in a descriptive
perspective (recall that simple instrument rules at most explain two thirds of the empirical
variance of interest-rate changes), and they should be frequent, from a normative perspective
(since the simple instrument rules are not optimal and do not take judgement into account).
In contrast, targeting rules should be much more complete rules, because there are few good
reasons to deviate from them, since they allow the use of judgment and extra-model information.
55Macroeconomics long ago stopped modeling private economic agents as following mechani-
cal rules for consumption, saving, production and investment decisions; instead, they are now
normally modeled as optimizing agents that achieve ﬁrst-order conditions, Euler conditions.
It is long overdue to acknowledge that modern central banks are, at least when it comes to
the inﬂation targeters, optimizing to at least the same extent time as private economic agents;
therefore their behavior can be better modeled with the help of targeting rules than with simple
instrument rules.
As stated (several times) above, optimal speciﬁc targeting rules simply state the equality of
the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution between the target
variables in an operational way. Since the marginal rates of transformation depend only on
the derivatives of the transmission mechanism with respect to the target variables, the optimal
speciﬁc targeting rules are inherently simpler and more robust than the optimal instrument rules,
which depend on all aspects of the transmission mechanism. In particular, additive judgement
and “add factors” do not enter in the formulation of the speciﬁc targeting rules, because they do
not appear in the derivatives. Still, the optimal speciﬁc targeting rules are fully consistent with
the use of judgment and extra-model information, since these enter into the construction of the
forecasts that have to fulﬁll the speciﬁc targeting rule. In contrast, the optimal instrument rules
have to include judgment explicitly, making them overwhelmingly complex and, in practice,
impossible to verify.
In conclusion, then, what are the rules for good monetary policy, the initial question posed
in this paper? My suggestion is: (1) Specify operational objectives, the general targeting rule.
That is, specify the target variables, the targets, and the relative weight(s) on stabilizing the
target variables around their targets. (2) Estimate the dynamic tradeoﬀs between the target
variables, the marginal rates of transformation. In the standard case when the target variables
are inﬂation and the output gap, this means estimating a Phillips curve. (3) Given these
marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of substitution from the loss function,
calculate a ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy, that is, a speciﬁc targeting rule. If this
speciﬁc targeting rule is too complicated to be operational, simplify. In most cases, this will
result in an operational condition for the forecasts of the target variables. (4) Estimate the
rest of the transmission mechanism, that is, the dynamic impact of the instrument rate on
the target variables. (5) Conditional on the estimated transmission mechanism and on current
information and judgment, construct a set of forecast paths for the target variables for a set
56of alternative instrument-rate paths. Select the forecasts and the instrument paths that best
fulﬁll the speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e ,a n ds e tt h ec u r r e n ti n s t r u m e n tr a t ea c c o r d i n g l y . ( 6 )W h e n
estimates of the marginal rates of transformation between the target variables are updated,
revise the speciﬁc targeting rule correspondingly. (7) Explain all this in transparent monetary-
policy reports, modeled on the Monetary Policy Statements of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
or the Inﬂation Reports of the Bank of England and the Riksbank.
These rules for good monetary policy acknowledge that the speciﬁc targeting rules, the Euler
conditions of monetary policy, will depend on the transmission mechanism via the marginal rates
of transformation between the target variables. Therefore, they allow for revisions of the speciﬁc
targeting rules when the estimate of these marginal rates of transformation change. This way,
the overall rules for good monetary policy are robust, but the speciﬁc targeting rule is allowed
to change with the estimated marginal rates of transformation.
There may be cases when the dynamic tradeoﬀs between the target variables are too complex
to result in a simple operational speciﬁc targeting rule. In such cases, the central bank may
have to abandon an attempt to ﬁnd a speciﬁc targeting rule and instead have to rely on the
general targeting rule, namely selecting the forecasts and the instrument path that best seem
to minimize the intertemporal loss function. Although this can be done in more informal and
intuitive ways, given numerical representations of the alternative forecasts and a speciﬁed loss
function, the loss function can always be evaluated numerically for each forecast alternative, in
order to assist the decision-making body of the bank in ﬁnding the best alternative.
Further research on general and speciﬁc targeting rules should both lead to a better under-
standing of actual monetary-policy practice and also better contribute to the further improve-
ment of that practice: Regarding general targeting rules, how can central banks be more speciﬁc
about the loss function they (explicitly or implicitly) apply?58 Regarding ﬂexible inﬂation tar-
geting, how can central banks specify the other objective(s) besides stabilizing inﬂation and the
relative weight(s) on this (these) objective(s)? Regarding speciﬁc targeting rules, is it possible
to provide more optimal, but still operational, targeting rules than the Bank of England’s and
the Riksbank’s “the constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast about two years ahead should equal
the inﬂation target?” For instance, given an empirical forward- and backward-looking Phillips
curve, is there an operational close-to-optimal speciﬁc targeting rule involving inﬂation- and
output-gap forecasts? How robust is such a speciﬁc targeting rule to realistic revisions of the
58 Svensson [92] and [95] provide some suggestions on this point.
57Phillips curve? If some fraction of the current research on simple instrument rules were directed
towards the study of targeting rules, we would soon know the answers to these questions.
A The backward-looking model
In period t,c o n s i d e rﬁnding the combination of forecasts and instrument plan, (πt,x t,i t), that
minimizes (5.1) subject to (5.2), (5.3) and the judgment zt.
Given that the only target variables are πt and xt, this minimization can be simpliﬁed
into two stages. The ﬁrst stage is to minimize (5.1), conditional on πt, πt+1,t, xt and zt and
including only the constraint (5.2). This results in optimal forecasts, ˆ πt ≡ {ˆ πt+τ,t}∞
τ=0 and
ˆ xt ≡ {ˆ xt+τ,t}∞
τ=0. The second stage is then to use these optimal forecasts in (5.3), which implies










to infer the optimal instrument plan ˆ ıt = {ˆ ıt+τ,t}∞
τ=0. The optimal instrument setting in period
t is then ˆ ıt =ˆ ıt,t,a n dˆ ıt+τ,t can be seen as a forecast of future instrument setting conditional on
current information (and the current judgment).









where Ξτ+1,t is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint (5.2). Note that πt, xt, πt+1,t and
zt+τ,t are predetermined for τ ≥ 1, and consider the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum, with
respect to πt+τ+1,t and xt+τ,t for τ ≥ 1. They are
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ + Ξτ+1,t − δΞτ+2,t =0 ( A . 3 )
with respect to πt+τ+1,t,a n d
λxt+τ,t− δαxΞτ+1,t =0 ( A . 4 )





Using this in (A.3), we can write a consolidated ﬁrst-order condition as
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ +
λ
δαx
(xt+τ,t− δxt+τ+1,t)=0 . (A.5)




(πt+τ+1,t − πt+τ,t− αzzt+τ+1,t)( A . 6 )
and use this to eliminate xt+τ,t in (A.5). This results in a diﬀerence equation for πt+τ+1,t,




[(πt+τ+1,t − πt+τ,t− αzzt+τ+1,t) − δ(πt+τ+2,t − πt+τ+1,t − αzzt+τ+2,t)] = 0.
58For the case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, λ>0, rewrite the diﬀerence equation as
















(since πt+1,t is given, it is natural to express the diﬀerence equation in terms of the inﬂation
forecasts).
By standard methods, the solution to this diﬀerence equation can be shown to fulﬁll
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ = c(πt+τ,t− π∗)+αzwt+τ+1,t (A.8)
for τ ≥ 1( r e c a l lt h a tπt+1,t is predetermined). Here, the coeﬃcient c fulﬁlls 0 <c<1a n di s
the smaller root of the characteristic equation,
µ2 − 2aµ +
1
δ
=0 ; ( A . 9 )
hence given by






Furthermore, c is an increasing function of λ, c(λ), which fulﬁlls c(0) = limλ→0 c(λ)=0 ,















For the case of strict inﬂation targeting, λ =0 ,w eh a v ec(0) = 0, ˜ zt+τ,t ≡ zt+τ,t and
wt+τ+1,t =0 ,s ot h e( A . 8 )i sr e p l a c e db y
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =0
for τ ≥ 1.









59By (A.1), the optimal interest setting in period t then follows










=¯ r + πt+1,t +
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A.1 A constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast
By (5.2) we have that the one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast, πt+1,t is given by
πt+1,t = πt + αxxt + αzzt+1,t (A.12)
and cannot be aﬀected by the current instrument. In contrast, by (5.3), the one-period-ahead
output-gap forecast, xt+1,t,i sg i v e nb y
xt+1,t = βrπt+1,t + βxxt + βzzt+1,t − βr(it − ¯ r)( A . 1 3 )
and can be aﬀected by the current instrument.
The two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast, πt+2,t, will by (5.2) and (A.13) be given by
πt+2,t = πt+1,t + αxxt+1,t + αzzt+2,t
= πt+1,t + αx[βrπt+1,t + βxxt + βzzt+1,t − βr(it − ¯ r)] + αzzt+2,t
=( 1 + αxβr)πt+1,t + αxβxxt + αxβzzt+1,t + αzzt+2,t − αxβr(it − ¯ r). (A.14)
Thus, we see that the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast depends on the one-period-ahead
inﬂation forecast, πt+1,t, the current output gap, xt, the one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of
the deviation, zt+1,t and zt+2,t, and the current interest rate relative to the average real interest
rate, it − ¯ r.
Let us also note that the two-period-ahead output-gap forecast, xt+2,t,i sg i v e nb y
xt+2,t = βrπt+2,t + βxxt+1,t + βzzt+2,t − βr(it+1,t − ¯ r)
= βr[(1 + αxβr)πt+1,t + αxβxxt + αxβzzt+1,t + αzzt+2,t − αxβr(it − ¯ r)]
+βx[βrπt+1,t + βxxt + βzzt+1,t − βr(it − ¯ r)] + βzzt+2,t − βr(it+1,t − ¯ r)
=( 1 + αxβr + βx)βrπt+1,t +( αxβr + βx)βxxt
+(αxβr + βx)βzzt+1,t +( αzβr + βz)zt+2,t
−(αxβr + βx)βr(it − ¯ r) − βr(it+1,t − ¯ r)( A . 1 5 )
Thus, the two-period-ahead output-gap forecasts depends on the one-period-ahead inﬂation fore-
cast, πt+1,t, the current output gap, xt, the one- and two-period-ahead forecast of the deviation,
zt+1,t and zt+2,t, and the current and one-period-ahead forecasts of the interest rate, it and it+1,t.
60Construct the 3-period-ahead inﬂation forecast,
πt+3,t = πt+2,t + αxxt+2,t + αzzt+3,t
=( 1 + αxβr)πt+1,t + αxβxxt + αxβzzt+1,t + αzzt+2,t − αxβr(it − ¯ r)
+αx[(1 + αxβr + βx)βrπt+1,t +( αxβr + βx)βxxt]
+αx[(αxβr + βx)βzzt+1,t +( αzβr + βz)zt+2,t]+αzzt+3,t
−αx[(αxβr + βx)βr(it − ¯ r)+βr(it+1,t − ¯ r)]
=[ 1 + αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr]πt+1,t + αx(1 + αxβr + βx)βxxt
+αx(1 + αxβr + βx)βzzt+1,t +[ αx(αzβr + βz)+αz]zt+2,t + αzzt+3,t
−αx(1 + αxβr + βx)βr(it − ¯ r) − αxβr(it+1,t − ¯ r). (A.16)
Consider the constant interest rate, it = it+1,t,f o rw h i c hπt+3,t = π∗.T h i s i m p l i e s t h e
equation,
π∗ =[ 1 + αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr]πt+1,t + αx(1 + αxβr + βx)βxxt
+αx(1 + αxβr + βx)βzzt+1,t +[ αx(βrαz + βz)+αz]zt+2,t + αzzt+3,t
−αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr(it − ¯ r).
Solving for it gives the reaction function
it =¯ r + π∗ + fπ(πt+1,t − π∗)+fxxt + fz1zt+1,t + fz2zt+2,t + fz3zt+3,t, (A.17)
where
fπ ≡
1+αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr
αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr
> 1, (A.18)
fx ≡
(1 + αxβr + βx)βx
(2 + αxβr + βx)βr
> 0, (A.19)
fz1 ≡
(1 + αxβr + βx)βz








αx(2 + αxβr + βx)βr
. (A.22)
B The forward-looking model










where Ξt+τ,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (5.5) for period t + τ,c o n s i d e r e di n
period t.D i ﬀerentiating with respect to πt+τ+1,t and xt+τ+1,t gives the ﬁrst-order conditions
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ − Ξt+τ+1,t + Ξt+τ,t =0 , (B.2)
λxt+τ+1,t + αxΞt+τ+1,t =0 ( B . 3 )
61for τ ≥ 0, together with the initial condition
Ξt,t =0 . (B.4)
Eliminating the Lagrange multipliers leads to the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ +
λ
αx
(xt+τ+1,t − xt+τ,t)=0 ( B . 5 )
for τ ≥ 1a n d
πt+1,t − π∗ +
λ
αx
xt+1,t =0 ( B . 6 )
for τ =0 . T h u s ,ﬁnding the optimal forecasts is reduced to the problem of ﬁnding πt, xt and
Ξt ≡ {Ξt+τ,t}∞
τ=1 that satisfy (5.5) and (B.2)—(B.4), or, equivalently, πt and xt that satisfy (5.5),
(B.5) and (B.6).
By taking the unconditional mean of (B.5), it follows that there is no average inﬂation bias
E[πt+τ,t]=π∗. (B.7)
As noted in Woodford [113] and discussed in detail in Svensson and Woodford [96], these
ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne a decision procedure that will not be time-consistent (under the case
of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, λ>0). This can be seen from the fact that the initial condition
(B.4) and the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for τ =1 ,( B . 6 ) ,a r ed i ﬀerent from that for
τ ≥ 2, (B.5). This results because, in deciding on πt+1,t, the central bank takes the previous
period’s forecast πt+1,t−1 as given, and lets πt+1,t deviate from it without assigning any speciﬁc
cost to doing so. As a result, the forecasts in period t are not generally consistent with the
forecasts made in period t − 1, even if no new information is received in period t.
To see this, suppose that the forecasts πt−1 and xt−1 were constructed in period t−1s oa st o
minimize the intertemporal loss function (5.1) with t−1 substituted for t. The same procedure
in period t−1 as above then resulted in the same ﬁrst-order conditions (B.5) and (B.6), although
with t − 1 substituted for t.T h u s ,i np e r i o dt − 1, the ﬁrst-order condition for τ =2w a s
πt+1,t−1 − π∗ +
λ
αx
(xt+1,t−1 − xt,t−1)=0 . (B.8)
Without any new information in period t relative to period t−1, we should have πt+1,t = πt+1,t−1
and xt+1,t = xt+1,t−1 for intertemporal consistency. From (B.6) and (B.8) it is apparent that
this will not be the case, unless by chance xt,t−1 =0 .
As discussed in Svensson and Woodford [96]), time-consistency is ensured under optimization
“in a timeless perspective,” which corresponds to imposing the initial condition
Ξt,t = Ξt,t−1
for the Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t. That is, the multiplier Ξt,t i ss e te q u a lt ot h es h a d o wc o s to f
the one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast from the previous period.
Equivalently, (B.6) is replaced by
πt+1,t − π∗ +
λ
αx
(xt+1,t − xt,t−1)=0 , (B.9)
where xt,t−1 is the one-period-ahead output-gap forecast from the previous period. Equivalently,
we can let (B.5) apply for τ ≥ 0 instead of τ ≥ 1, with the initial condition
xt,t = xt,t−1 (B.10)
62imposed. That is, in the ﬁrst-order condition (B.5), xt,t does not denote the current output gap,
xt, but the forecast one period ago of the current output gap, xt,t−1.
For the case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (λ>0), substituting (B.5) into (5.5) leads to the
diﬀerence equation
















(note that (B.11) is similar to (A.7) except that the last term diﬀers). (Since xt,t is given (by
B.10), it is natural to express the diﬀerence equation in terms of the output-gap forecasts.)
By standard methods, it can be shown that the solution to the diﬀerence equation, the











where ˜ zt+τ+1,t is deﬁned as in (3.2) and c (0 ≤ c<1) is the smaller root of the characteristic
equation (A.9) and hence again is given by (A.10) (but with a given by (B.11)), is an increasing
function c(λ)o fλ,a n df u l ﬁlls c(0) = 0, c(∞)=1 .59
The optimal inﬂation forecast then fulﬁlls, by (B.5),
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =
λ
αx
(1 − c)xt+τ,t+ cαz˜ zt+τ+1,t. (B.13)
The optimal interest-rate path will by (5.5) and (B.5) follow
it+τ+1,t = r∗






























The optimal interest-rate decision in period t for the interest rate in period t +1i st h e ng i v e n
by (note the loose relation to “forecast-based” instrument rules)
it+1,t = r∗





















)c{[1 − δc(1 − c)]αz˜ zt+2,t − (1 − c)αzzt+1,t}, (B.15)
59 If the smaller root of (A.9) with (A.7) as a function of λ is denoted ˆ c(λ), the smaller root of (A.9) with
(B.11) is obviously ˆ c(δλ), for ﬁxed δ.
63where we use that the two-period-ahead inﬂation forecast is given by
πt+2,t − π∗ =
λ
αx



















c(1 − c)xt,t + c{[1 − δc(1 − c)]αz˜ zt+2,t − (1 − c)αzzt+1,t},




(δc)szt+1+s,t ≡ δc˜ zt+2,t + zt+1,t.












For the case of strict inﬂation targeting (λ =0 ) ,w eh a v e
πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =0
for τ ≥ 0 from (B.5). From (5.5) then follows






The optimal instrument-rate decision in period t is then given by
it+1,t = r∗














(zt+2,t − zt+1,t). (B.17)
B.1 The discretion case
As discussed in Svensson and Woodford [96], the ﬁrst-order condition under discretion is











xt+τ+2,t + αxxt+τ+1,t + αzzt+τ+1,t.
64The solution will fulﬁll









πt+τ+1,t − π∗ =˜ cαz˜ zt+τ+1,t
where ˜ zt+τ+1,t is deﬁn e da si n( 3 . 2 )( w i t h˜ c replacing c), and





The corresponding reaction function is
it+1,t = r∗




































t+1,t + π∗ +
˜ c
βrλ
[βrλ − αx(1 − δ˜ c)]αz˜ zt+2,t +
αx˜ cαzzt+1,t + λβzzt+1,t
βrλ
. (B.21)
B.2 A constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast
As explained in the appendix of the working-paper version of Svensson [88], constructing constant-
interest-rate forecasts in a forward-looking model requires some special considerations (see also
Leitemo [56]). Basically, some assumptions mustb em a d ea b o u tf u t u r ep o l i c yi no r d e rt oc o n -
struct determinate forecasts. The forecasts will not be rational-expectations forecasts, in that
the constant-interest-rate path will not materialize even in the absence of new information or
new judgment.
Here is an example:
In period t, impose the conditions that the interest rate is constant 3 periods ahead,
it+1,t = it+2,t = it+3,t. (B.22)
Furthermore, assume that we like to ﬁnd the constant interest rate (for the next 3 periods) for
which the corresponding 3-period-ahead inﬂation forecast is on target,
πt+3,t = π∗. (B.23)
We must make some assumptions about the economy after period 3 in order to have a
determinate solution. Assume, for instance, that policy is optimal from (t+4,t) onwards (where
(t + τ,t) denotes period t + τ seen from the forecasting done in period t). Then πt+4,t, xt+4,t
and it+4,t are given by (B.13), (B.12) and (B.14), respectively. In particular, they depend on
xt+3,t, which remains to be determined.
65By (5.5) for (t +3 ,t), given that πt+4,t is a function of xt+3,t, and given (B.23) and zt+3,t,
we can solve for xt+3,t.T h e nπt+4,t and xt+4,t are determined.
By (5.6) for (t +3 ,t), given xt+4,t, xt+3,t, πt+4,t,a n dzt+3,t,w eg e tit+3,t and, by (B.22),
also it+1,t and it+2,t. From now on, we can exploit the simple recursivity of the forward-looking
model:
By (5.6) for (t +2 ,t), given xt+3,t,( B . 2 3 ) ,zt+2,t,a n dit+2,t,w eg e txt+2,t.
By (5.5) for (t +2 ,t), given (B.23), xt+3,t and zt+3,t we get πt+2,t.
By (5.6) for (t +1 ,t), given xt+2,t, πt+2,t, zt+2,t,a n dit+1,t,w eg e txt+1,t.
By (5.5) for (t +1 ,t), given πt+2,t, xt+1,t and zt+1,t we get πt+1,t.
Thus, we have found (πt,x t,i t) for which (B.23) and (B.22) holds.
Suppose this procedure is followed each period t and it+1,t is implemented in each period t+1.
In period t + 1, even in the absence of any new information (any change in the judgment), the
resulting it+2,t+1 will diﬀer from it+2,t,s i n c ei np e r i o dt+1 (B.23) is replaced by πt+4,t+1 = π∗.
T h u s ,w ew i l lh a v eπt+2,t+1 and xt+2,t+1 diﬀering from πt+2,t and xt+2,t. In particular, rational
plans by the private sector will incorporate rational interest-rate expectations of the time-varying
interest rate, so it+2|t =E [ it+2,t+1|It] 6= it+1,t. Consequently, the private-sector plans πt+1|t and
xt+1|t will diﬀer from the constant-interest-rate forecasts πt+1,t and xt+1,t.
This will typically not fulﬁll (B.5) and not be optimal. This may not even be close to
optimal. Leitemo [56] provides more details. Kohn [52] provides a more general discussion of
constant-interest-rate forecasts.
C An optimal reaction function with response to forecasts for an unchanged
interest rate
This appendix shows how a forecast-based instrument rule involving precisely deﬁned unchanged-
interest-rate rather than equilibrium forecasts can be derived from the optimal targeting rule.
C.1 The backward-looking model
For the backward-looking forward-looking model, let (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt) be the optimal equilibrium fore-
casts and instrument-rate path. For a given i,l e t[ ¯ πt(i), ¯ xt(i),¯ ıt(i)] correspond to an equilibrium
where it,t = i but it+τ,t is optimal for τ ≥ 1 (conditional on it,t = i). Then, for ¯ ıt(i), (A.5) will
be fulﬁlled for τ ≥ 1, but not for τ = 0 (except if i =ˆ ıt,t). An unchanged interest rate in period
t then corresponds to i = it−1.W er e a l i z et h a tw eh a v e
ˆ πt+2,t =¯ πt+2,t(it−1) − a(ˆ ıt,t − it−1),
ˆ xt+1,t =¯ xt+1,t(it−1) − b(ˆ ıt,t − it−1),
ˆ xt+2,t =¯ xt+2,t(it−1) − d(ˆ ıt,t − it−1),
where a ≡− ∂¯ πt+2,t(it−1)/∂i and b ≡− ∂¯ xt+1,t(it−1)/∂i and d ≡− ∂¯ xt+2,t(it−1)/∂i are the
derivatives of πt+2,t and xt+1,t with respect to i at the equilibrium (¯ πt(it−1), ¯ xt(it−1),¯ ıt(it−1)).
The coeﬃcients a, b and c are endogenously determined in the equilibrium, but once determined,
they are constant, due to the linearity of the model. Since ˆ πt+2,t,ˆ xt+2,t and ˆ xt+1,t fulﬁll (A.5)




{[¯ xt+1,t(it−1)−b(ˆ ıt,t−it−1)]−δ[¯ xt+2,t(it−1)−d(ˆ ıt,t−it−1)]} =0 .
66It follows that we can write
ˆ ıt,t − it−1 =
1
a + λ(b − δd)/δαx
[¯ πt+2,t(it−1) − π∗]
−
λ/αx
a + λ(b − δd)/δαx
[δ¯ xt+2,t(it−1) − ¯ xt+1,t(it−1)]. (C.1)
It follows that the optimal change in the interest rate from period t − 1t ot,ˆ ıt,t − it−1,c a n
be seen as a linear response to the deviation of a two-period-ahead forecast from the inﬂation
target, ¯ πt+2,t(it−1) − π∗, and to the two-period-ahead forecast of the modiﬁed change in the
output gap, δ¯ xt+2,t(it−1) − ¯ xt+1,t(it−1).
C.2 The forward-looking model
For the forward-looking model, let (ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt) be the optimal equilibrium forecasts and instrument-
rate path. Recall that in the forward-looking model, the relevant decision in period t concerns
it+1,t.F o rag i v e ni,l e t[ ¯ πt(i), ¯ xt(i),¯ ıt(i)] correspond to an equilibrium where it+1,t = i but it+τ,t
is optimal for τ ≥ 2 (conditional on it+1,t = i). Then, for ¯ ıt(i), (B.5) will be fulﬁlled for τ ≥ 2,
but not for τ = 1 (except if i =ˆ ıt+1,t). Now, a decision in period t of an unchanged interest rate
corresponds to i = it.W er e a l i z et h a tw eh a v e
ˆ πt+1,t =¯ πt+1,t(it) − a(ˆ ıt+1,t − it)
ˆ xt+1,t =¯ xt+1,t(it) − b(ˆ ıt+1,t − it),
where a ≡− ∂¯ πt+1,t(it)/∂i and b ≡− ∂¯ xt+1,t(it)/∂i are the derivatives of πt+1,t and xt+1,t
with respect to i at the equilibrium [¯ πt(i), ¯ xt(i),¯ ıt(i)]. (Note that xt,t = xt,t−1 is the previous
optimal forecast in period t − 1 and is not aﬀected by i.) Again, the coeﬃcients a, b and c
are endogenously determined in the equilibrium but constant, once determined, because of the
linearity of the model. Since ˆ πt+1,t and ˆ xt+1,t fulﬁll (B.5) for τ =1 ,w eh a v e
[¯ πt+1,t(it) − π∗ − a(ˆ ıt+1,t − it)] +
λ
αx
[¯ xt+1,t(it) − b(ˆ ıt+1,t − it) − xt,t−1].
It follows that we can write
ˆ ıt+1,t − it =
1
a + λb/αx
[¯ πt+1,t(it) − π∗]+
λ/αx
a + λb/αx
[¯ xt+1,t(it) − xt,t−1]. (C.2)
It follows that the optimal change in the interest rate from period t to t +1 ,ˆ ıt+1,t − it,c a n
be seen as a linear response to the one-period-ahead forecast of the inﬂation gap, ¯ πt+1,t(it)−π∗,
and the change in the forecast of output gap, ¯ xt+1,t(it) − xt−1,t (relative not to the previous
unchanged-interest-rate forecast ¯ xt,t−1(it−1) but to the previous optimal forecast, xt,t−1), where
both forecasts for period t + 1 are conditional on an unchanged instrument rate, it+1,t = it.
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